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Since the beginning of the nineties, the North American Free Trade Agreement
(hereinafter NAFTA) issue has been a fundamental one in the political and economical
aspects of Mexico, where the treaty was presented to most Mexican citizens as an
instrument that would lead the nation to another world, the one of development.
The Salinas administration contemplated it as the ultimate goal to achieve;
everything else, economic and social improvements, would come afterwards. Mexican
citizens suffered through the entire process of the negotiations, except for some skeptics
or people who opposed the agreement.
When then presidential candidate Clinton announced that he would not support
NAFTA without environmental and labor side agreements, and during the period before
NAFTA's ratification by the American Congress, Mexicans lived in a most tense
suspense. Even though, the idea of an environmental side agreement seemed to please
most environmentalists in Mexico (category in which the author was, and is still,
included) who hoped that this would lead to create a major environmental conscience in
the Mexican Government.
The purpose of this paper, then, will be to elaborate a critical analysis of the North
American Free Trade Agreement, its related documents and their effects concerning the
environment, specifically its legal protection. We will start with a brief resume of the
relations of trade and environment, then continuing with an overview of the document's
history and provisions, analyzing the document's effects in Mexico, the nation that
should be mainly concerned with the environmental effects of NAFTA, and, finally,
conducting a brief comparison with what is happening with the European Union,
concerning trade-environmental issues, before we reach the proper conclusions.
CHAPTER ONE
TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT
The relation between both issues
Before beginning with the analysis of NAFTA or its side agreement on
environmental matters, the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
(hereinafter NAAEC), we believe it is necessary to establish a connection between trade
and environment and the reasons why one may affect the other. This must be done, since,
after all, trade, not environment, is the essential issue of the NAFTA and its related
documents, such as the NAAEC.
First of all, if one takes a look at the diverse international trade agreements, two
basic instruments to foment trade may be discovered 1 . One of them is the phasing out of
tariffs, mechanism that, at a first glance, may not appear to be a reason for
environmentalists to be worried about. It is the second instrument that produces the major
concern: the elimination of nontariff barriers to trade, in which environmental provisions
and standards may be included. This second instrument may be provided by agreements,
as GATT and NAFTA, which establish legal instruments for removing such barriers,
many times taking into consideration only an economic criterion, leaving other aspects,
as environmental damages, aside or without the necessary regard.
One example of this issue is the Tuna-Dolphin case of 1991, in which Mexico was
favored by a successful commercial challenge under GATT in relation with an American
provision that banned the import of Mexican tuna, due to its fishing methods
1
See PIERRE MARC JOHNSON & ANDRE BEAULIEU, THE ENVIRONMENT AND NAFTA,
UNDERSTANDING AND IMPLEMENTING THE NEW CONTINENTAL LAW 41-43 (1996).
3
that caused the death of a large amount of dolphins. Issues of sovereignty and
extraterritorial enforcement of laws were decisive in the resolution. In this case, many
environmentalists saw a dilemma, which demonstrated that environmental issues were
subordinate to trade issues and that there was an inherent defect in the structure and
provisions of the GATT and the international trade system. Thus, a general theory arouse
between many environmentalists, consisting of the concept that countries should be
permitted to develop and adhere to environmental standards without regard to their
effects upon trade objectives .
Damien Geradin
3
speaks about three areas of conflict between trade and
environment. The first one is with regard to the area of waste. Waste is a good whose free
movement may be protected by free-trade provisions, but hindered by environmental
laws, trying to protect the national environment.
A second area of conflict would be the area of product standards. These may
regulate the characteristics of products - including environmental ones - offered for sale
in a determined market. Such standards may be used for protectionist goals, affecting
free-trade.
Finally, a third area of conflict would be with regard to the area of process
standards, which regulate production methods used in the manufacture of products.
Inconsistent process standards between countries may distort free trade, since they differ
the costs of production, creating unequal conditions of competition. This would be a
cause for pollution havens to exist, as we will later see.
So, as one can clearly discern, this may explain the reason why many
environmentalists are not so fond of free trade (being quite skeptical of the issue), and
See Alison Raina Ferrante, The Dolphin/Tuna Controversy' and Environmental Issues: Will the World
Trade Organization's "Arbitration Court" and the International Court of Justice's Chamber for
Environmental Matters Assist the United States and the World in Furthering Environmental Goals?, at
Florida State University Journal of Transnational Law & Policy (1996).
3 DAMIEN GERADIN, TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT, A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF EC AND US
LAW, 2-4 (1997).
raise diverse arguments against it, such as : a) promoting economic growth through trade
liberalization is incompatible with environmental goals; b) trade liberalization rules affect
the capacity of governments to legislate in favor of the environment; c) free trade
promotes the constitution of pollution havens; d) trade law principles prevent importers to
impede the entrance into its market of products from an exporter that does not respect
environmental laws or international environmental agreements e) lack of transparency
and access in trade regimes; f) trade generates the disappearance of small local industries
that have a history of environmental sound use of natural resources.
While some of these arguments appear to present strong reasons to establish an
incompatibility between free trade and environmental goals, at least one of them may be
easily debated. The first of them, that establishes an almost religious conception of the
"evil" of economic growth against environmental goals, certainly brings into one's mind
the concept of sustainable development". Though a somewhat ambiguous term,
sustainable development, understood herein as "development that meets the needs of the
present without comprising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs6
,
which requires the maintenance, rational use and enhancement of the natural resource
base that underpins ecological resilience and economic growth and implies progress
towards international equity " is not inconsistent with economic growth. Furthermore,
economic growth may even help environmental objectives in developing countries where
4
For further details of the first five arguments, see JOHNSON & BEAULIEU, supra note 1, at 37-60. See
also Carlos Perez del Castillo, International Trade and Environment, Sustainable Development: A
Challenge for Underdeveloped Countries, in ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 193, 197-200
(1995).
Even though, this argument has also a more restricted and reasonable variant. As Daniel C. Esty
(Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment and the Future, 1994, cited in Thomas J. Schoembaum,
International Trade and Protection of the Environment: The Continuing Searchfor Reconciliation, 91 Am.
J. Int'l L. 268 (1997)) identifies, without the proper safeguards, by promoting economic growth, some
results may be the unsustainable consumption of goods and an excess waste production, that may lead to
the generation of environmental harms.
6 WCED, Our Common Future, at 43.
7 UNEP Governing Council Decision 15/2 of May 1989, Annex II, GAOR, 44 th Session Suppl. No. 25
5
poverty is an important issue concerning natural resources misuse . As for the other
arguments against free trade, their strength varies in diverse degrees and they have had a
basis on the application of the GATT provisions and other trade agreements.
Can trade and environment come to friendly terms that manage to stop this
apparently irreconcilable dispute? At least most of the environmentalists seem to agree
that there must be a solution for the problem, a point where both sides can come to an
arrangement. Even though, basically among the supporters of the first argument, which
considers free trade and economic growth as immoral concepts, it is evident that no kind
of possible settlement can be made. Besides, more investigation must be made
concerning the relation of both issues
9
, a most burdensome labor indeed. It appears that
this conflict will lead to the inclusion of environmental considerations into most trade
agreements, something that NAFTA and, more specifically, its side agreement, the
NAAEC, do. Consequently, environmental interests will have to coexist with
international trade, which does not necessarily imply that sustainable development and




See THEODORE PANAYOTOU, GREEN MARKETS: THE ECONOMICS OF SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT (ICS Press, 1993) for analysis of the relationship between poverty and environment,
especially for what concerns management of natural resources. Even though, this obviously does not mean
that economic growth shall, by itself, constitute the sole element to diminish poverty and related
environmental problems, since other political, social and cultural issues are of great importance in this
issue.
9
See WTO, Trade and Environment in the WTO, (1998), WTO Members believe that work in the WTO on
contributing to build a constructive relationship between trade, environment and sustainable development
needs to continue. The Committee on Trade and Environment, established in Marrakesh in 1994 for those
purposes, is continuing that work, finding it quite more difficult than how it was initially anticipated. See
also A.L.C. de Maestral, The Significance of the NAFTA Side Agreements on Environmental and Labour
Cooperation, 15 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 169, 170 (1998): Traditionally, it has been difficult to reconcile
the values of trade as embodied in the GATT, with other social and economic values such as those
pertaining to the protection of the environment... Considerable work has been done by ...[the Committee
on Trade and Environment] ... but few results have yet been achieved.
See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade and Protection of the Environment: The Continuing
Search for Reconciliation, 91 Am. J. Int'l L. 268 (1997), for a support of the possibility of a multilateral
trading system which does not imply the existence of a fundamental conflict with environmental protection.
6
All the aforementioned arguments, expressing the potential conflict between free
trade objectives and environmental interests, appeared in the debate over the NAFTA in
the early nineties, as will be explained later on in the chapters to come.
Foreign Direct Investment and environment
Finally, to end the current chapter, it is of extreme importance to speak about an
issue that is strictly related to trade, and is also contemplated in NAFTA. This is Foreign
Direct Investment, hereinafter FDI.
FDI may be seen by some as a real blessing for environmental purposes, whereas
others may consider it as a curse for the same objectives. What is the reason for this
controversy? First, we must examine the green benefits that come with FDI.
FDI may provide the capital required for developing countries in order to reach
sustainable development, though that is only one of many factors to achieve such a goal,
of course. FDI also provides the required "infrastructure development, technology
transfers, capacity building in the form of technological and management training to
individuals in the host state (... the one that receives the investment) and environmental
leadership in many cases" 11 .
The "green" side of FDI may be seen in several mechanisms implemented by
international agreements and conventions, such as the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change and, more specifically, its Kyoto Protocol.
The Kyoto Protocol establishes three different kinds of flexibility mechanisms
12
, for
"green purposes" (in this case, the prevention of climate change and its effects, originated
Konrad von Moltke, An International Investments Regime? Issues of Sustainability, Section 1, cited in
HOWARD MANN & KONRAD VON MOLTKE, NAFTA'S CHAPTER 11 AND THE
ENVIRONMENT ADDRESSING THE IMPACTS OF THE INVESTOR-STATE PROCESS ON THE
ENVIRONMENT 1 (1999).
12
Kyoto Protocol, Articles 6.1, 12.2 and 17.
7
from human activities). Among these, we find that both the Joint Implementation and the
Clean Development mechanisms promote a green kind of FDI.
The Clean Development mechanism allows governments or private entities in
industrialized countries to implement emission reduction projects in developing countries
in order to meet their emission objectives. The industrialized nations "receive credit for
these projects in the form of "certified emission reductions" (CERs)... [t]he purpose of
the CDM is to promote "sustainable development" while contributing to the objective of
the [UNJFCCC. In contrast, the purpose of J[oint] Implementation mechanism],
according to the Protocol, is... [to allow] Annex I [developed] countries to work together
to meet their emission targets, transfer[ring] or acquiring] emission reduction units
resulting from projects and activities implemented in other Annex I countries." In this
regard, the aforementioned mechanisms promote a special kind of FDI which will bring
positive results for environmentalists.
But with FDI, many risks are also involved. After all, FDI is a matter of business in
the vast majority of cases, not of international assistance. Though many institutions and
international regimes are promoting the kind of green FDI we saw in the previous
paragraph, those only constitute the exception to the rule. Hence, both investors and host
countries, for what concerns this issue, will be obviously much more interested in the
money-making topic than in the protection of the environment. This may bring as a result
that the host country tries to attract investments not only by providing investors with
security and predictability, but also by lowering their (among others) environmental
13
Chad Carpenter & Ben Simmons, Flexibility Mechanisms, USD (Dec. 30, 1999)
<http://www.iisd.ca/flexmech/expl.cfm>
8
requirements, generating a problem of pollution havens and "race to the bottom"
lowering of standards .
14 HOWARD MANN & KONRAD VON MOLTKE, NAFTA'S CHAPTER 11 AND THE
ENVIRONMENT, ADDRESSING THE IMPACTS OF THE INVESTOR-STATE PROCESS ON THE
ENVIRONMENT 7 (1999).
CHAPTER TWO
HISTORY OF NAFTA AND NAAEC
In this chapter, a brief summary of the origins of both NAFTA and its side
agreement, the NAAEC, will be made, analyzing some of the arguments that NGOs
established against the first of them, which later on generated the creation of the NAAEC.
It must be noticed that an emphasis will be made in the facts that occurred in the United
States of America, since it is in this country where the environmental community made a
virtual crusade that led to the creation of the NAAEC as a side agreement to NAFTA,
attending to the environmental issues that were not contemplated in the main document.
The long story of the NAFTA package commenced in July of 1990, when the
Presidents of the United States of America and Mexico, at that time George Bush and
Carlos Salinas de Gortari, approved the plan of a free trade agreement. Some months




After the first public announcement of the NAFTA proposal, environmental groups
from the United States of America initiated a most impressive campaign to influence the
political leaders of their country, so that their claims would be really taken in
consideration, something that occurred for the first time during the negotiations of an
international trade agreement.
It must be remembered that the Tuna-Dolphin case was fresh in many
environmentalists' memories, who therefore were afraid that something similar would
occur with NAFTA, and demanded some safeguards against that possibility. Another
issue of particular concern to the American NGO community was the problem of border
15
Joseph F. DiMento & Pamela M. Doughman, Soft Teeth in the Back of the Mouth: the NAFTA
Environmental Side Agreement Implemented, 10 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 651, 659 (1998).
10
pollution. Despite several attempts of both countries to solve the problem, especially
pollution generated by •"maquiladoras ". not much had been accomplished, and it was
quite probable that with the free trade agreement the situation would become even worse
still. In this sense. NGOs tried to influence the NAFTA negotiations by presenting the
following statement: "If NAFTA did not properly address environmental concerns, the
environmental degradation of the border area would spread to the res: o: :r.? p'. armed ::::
trade zone."
16
Curiously, (at least for the author, who comes from a country where the r:r;er.;e of
NGOs is not so important) these concerns were taken in consideration by the Americas
Congress, so that when President Bush received fast track authority in order to negotiate
NAFTA, he had to promise Congress that environmental issues would be considered in
the Agreement. Even though, he refused to establish a special group to v. ; rk : n the
environmental-trade issues or to make the probable environmental solutions a necessary
condition to sign NAFTA. On May 1. 1991. President Bush answered the claims of
environmental groups by noting that environmental issues, such as the rights to impose
stringent standards, to exclude foreign products that did not meet national standards and
to establish limits to trade, in accordance with international environmental agreements,
would be taken in consideration in NAFTA .
The pressure of NGOs continued, and in August 1991. Public Citizen, on behalf of




. The issue at hand was whether NAFTA required an
Environmental Impact Statement before the President submitted it to Congress for
Ratification. The District Court ordered that the impact s:a:err.er.: be prepared, but. later
on. the Court of Appeals held that the Agreement was not a final agency action and.
16
See JOHNSON & BEAULIEU. npra note Lat27
See DiMentc & Dcughman. supra note 15. a: 66} See abo BARBARA HOGENBOOM, MEXICO
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groups did not sign said document, due to the fact that they did not agree on various
opinions. Consequently, the NGO community started dividing in different groups,
especially during the Clinton era. This situation ultimately led to a most noticeable
decrease of influence over the U.S. government's decisions in the NAFTA negotiations,
even if their presence continued.
The NGO community was divided in what seemed to be two major groups: the ones
that thought that trade and environment could be reconciled at all and the ones that did
not believe in that possibility' . The former, obviously more supportive of the NAFTA
package, hoped that more trade would mean an increased economic growth, something of
particular importance in Mexico, where poverty is an important factor of environmental
degradation. They also expected that more resources would be applied for environmental
projects. On the other hand, the NGOs that were against the agreement sustained that
more trade would mean more economic activity that lead to more environmental damage,
predication which, as was mentioned in the previous chapter, the author finds to be
mistaken.
Some of the main issues that the environmentalists who supported NAFTA wanted
to resolve with the side agreement, or within the main document, were: funding,




Many environmental groups wanted to use NAFTA and its future side agreement as
means to solve the major environmental damages that diverse industries, like the
"maquiladoras", had occasioned in the former years. For this, they proposed a trilateral
commission for the environmental problems, which would require funding.
23
See JOHNSON & BEAULIEU, supra note 1, at 32.
24
LESLIE A. GLICK, UNDERSTANDING NAFTA 92-97 (1994).
13
Enforcement
Environmental groups thought, correctly, that NAFTA did not include any
provisions that would force the three nations to comply with their environmental laws or
provisions. There was a particular concern about Mexico, since it did not have a
satisfactory history considering the enforcement of its environmental provisions. The
ideas of pollution havens and downward pressure on the laws of the United States, seen
on the former chapter, appeared to be quite strong among the majority of the NGO
community.
Language clarifications
The environmental groups were also worried about the vague and ambiguous
language used in most of the environmental-related provisions of NAFTA, since it would
mean problems for their interpretation and risked therefore the effectiveness of these.
This issue will be seen more thoroughly on the following chapter.
Public participation and transparency
As noted on the first Chapter, environmentalists were quite distrustful of the
procedures used in most trade agreements in the case of a dispute settlement, distrust that
had increased most considerably since the Tuna-Dolphin case of 1991. They were quite
disturbed that the dispute settlements in NAFTA, as GATT, also had a trend of secrecy,
as demonstrated by article 2012.1 (a) which requires confidentiality with regard to the
submissions and communications to the dispute panels. Environmental groups proposed
that the information and resolutions of the panels should be available to the general
public, as the meetings and records of procedures.
14
Other influence groups
It must be noticed that, until now, we have spoken only of one of the interest groups
of the NAFTA/NAAEC negotiations, the environmental NGOs. Even if they are the most
important ones regarding the environmental aspects of the NAFTA package, it is of the
uttermost importance to see the other ones, since the author thinks that, in the end, the
NGOs lost most of their influence, affecting the ultimate content of the NAAEC.
Therefore, the other interest groups to be analyzed are the governments of the three
countries and business groups
25
, who also influenced the negotiations.
The business groups, in general terms, wanted NAFTA to stay just like that, with no
side agreement at all, or a very weak one at the most. They expected that the side
agreement would not be tied to past environmental problems, and that trade sanctions
would not be included or only as a last resort, hoping that public attention of the
problems that arouse would be the instrument for compliance. In June 1993, various
American business groups sent U.S. Trade Representative a letter containing their major
concerns, in which they criticized the "unmanageable financial burdens on individual
companies stemming from the Secretariat's authority to investigate businesses in NAFTA
countries..." .
Other groups of interest were, of course, the governments. In the United States of
America, as expected since Clinton was elected President, the Party that desired the
establishment of the side agreement was the United States. The Clinton administration
wanted (or at least declared so) the judicial process of environmental disputes to be open
along with a strong environmental commission. Within Congress, there were split
opinions about the subject. While some congressmen, the environmentalists, believed that




See, DiMento & Doughman supra note 1 5, at 672.
15
reopened in order to include environmental issues and trade sanctions in the main
document, others were supporters of the original text, without any side agreement to be
included. But, in general terms, it could be said that if the NAFTA package were to be
ratified by Congress, it would need to include a side agreement in which the
environmental issues were contained.
The Mexican government, of course, was not so enthusiastic about the side
agreement. Leaving aside the fact that the side agreement was mainly a measure against
its lack of enforcement of environmental provisions, Mexico was concerned about issues
of sovereignty and opposed the idea of trade sanctions. It opposed the project of a strong
commission, with broad powers to investigate and remedy violations, imposing trade
sanctions. Even though, Mexico was afraid that if the side agreement was not
implemented, negotiations ofNAFTA would be reopened. This would probably mark the
moment when the Ministry of Commerce and Industrial Development of Mexico
(SECOFI) started to have a predominant status over the decision-making of other
ministries, such as the ministries of Health (SSA) and of Environment, Natural Resources
and Fisheries (SEMARNAP, founded in 1994).
Similar to Mexico's arguments, Canada did not want a commission with broad
powers to investigate and remedy violations, since it thought that was an issue better left
for the national courts. It feared that the side agreement would limit the legislative
capacity of its provinces to enact provisions that were more stringent than international
ones and therefore was also opposed to a side agreement that imposed trade sanctions that
affected its sovereignty.
After what seemed to be an outstandingly short period of negotiations, considering
the opposite interests and concerns of the diverse interest groups, the final text of the
NAAEC was completed in August 1993.
Many environmental groups seemed to support the NAFTA package, due to the
citizen petition process and the participation of NGOs in the Commission, but this
support was not universal, since Sierra Club and other NGOs, some of them
16
environmental organizations with a considerable political power due to their members,
opposed it with a most impressive fervor.
Even though, on September 15, 1994, six environmental organizations announced
their support of the NAFTA package, during a conference with Vice President Gore and
other government officials, even if an important issue still remained at hand: the
environmental problems along the border, not contemplated in the NAAEC . But the rift
in the NGO community ultimately lead to some important effects, since the side
agreement, NAAEC, would not effectively support their initial claims after all, as will be
seen in the following chapters.
27
Sierra Club alleged that there were four main reasons for their opposition: a) Countries would not be able
to regulate imports based on their production process methods; b) The dispute settlement was inadequate,
since no environmental experts participated and the proceedings were not open to the public; c) The
agreement did not attend to the border environmental problems, and d) It did not address correctly the
problem of lax environmental enforcement. See Id. at 678.
18
The environmental issues along the U.S.-Mexico border would be contemplated in another agreement,
signed in November, 1993, which established two institutions: the Border Environment Cooperation
Commission (BECC) and the North American Development Bank (NADBank). The BECC certifies or
approves projects related to environmental issues and refers them to the NADBank for funding
consideration. See Agreement Concerning the Establishment of a Border Environmental Cooperation
Commission and a North American Development Bank, Nov. 16 1993, U.S.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 1545.
CHAPTER THREE
NAFTA' S ENVIRONMENTAL PROVISIONS
Even without the side agreement, NAFTA was originally referred to as "the most
environmentally sensitive, greenest free trade agreement ever" , since the existent
international trade agreements at that time, such as the GATT, were not overly concerned
with environmental issues. Even though, at that time any trade agreement that mentioned
the words "environment" and "concern" would certainly be seen by the majority of
people (excluding environmentalists who started the crusade mentioned in the former
chapter) as a great advance towards the protection of the environment
30
.
The Preamble of NAFTA states that the governments of the three parties resolved
to: "undertake each of the preceding [purposes] in a manner consistent with
environmental protection and conservation"; "promote sustainable development", and
"strengthen the development and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations".
Certainly, NAFTA' s preamble addresses environmental issues in a way not seen
before in a multilateral trade agreement. Nevertheless, one must remember that the
preamble is not enforceable
31
, so it must be considered that these are just nice words,
with no real force to support them. They are only the common broad language used in
most documents, mainly cooperation agreements, to establish some general concerns of
the parties, but leaving them in such a diffuse manner that no enforcement measure can
proceed. The Preamble, in this sense, somehow reflects the reluctance of the Bush
9 News Conference with William Reilly, EPA Administrator, Federal News Service, Aug. 13, 1992, in
JOHNSON & BEAULIEU, supra note 1, at 30.
30
See Christopher N. Bolinger, Assessing the CEC on its Record to Date, 28 Law & Pol'y lnt'1 Bus. 1 107,
1111 (1997).
31
See JOHNSON & BEAULIEU, supra note 1, at 67.
17
18
Administration to open (more than what was strictly demanded and required) the
agreement to environmental issues.
But the Preamble is not the only provision in NAFTA that includes environmental
issues, since there are other articles, such as those contained in Chapters Seven and Nine,
and those referring to pollution havens and other international environmental agreements.
Chapter Eleven, related to FDI, has also proved to be relevant with regard to
environmental interests.
Chapter Seven
Chapter Seven of NAFTA refers to sanitary and phytosanitary measures.
Environmental groups, principally from the United States, were concerned that, under
this chapter, dispute settlements could be brought against environmental legal provisions
and the capacity of the governments to legislate in favor of the environment would be
restricted. The language used in this chapter, especially in article 712, did not help that
much to tranquilize those concerns, as we will see, even if some of the lack of clarity of
the provisions appears to be in favor of the challenged environmental provisions.
According to the NAFTA text, each Party is free to adopt its own levels of
protection of human, animal or plant life or health, with some limits , of which the most
important ones would be that the measures to be taken must not be arbitrary or
unjustifiable distinctions to disguise trade restrictions against another Party, in which case
the affected Party may bring a dispute settlement against such levels of protection.
But a dispute settlement may be brought also against the measures implemented to
achieve the desired levels of protection. In this sense, in order to survive a dispute
settlement, a sanitary or phytosanitary measure, in case of being more stringent than an
32




international one , should be: a) necessary to protect animal, plant or human life or
health; b) applied to the extent necessary to achieve the level of protection; c) only in its
own territory; d) based on scientific principles and risk assessment, and e) must not be a
disguised restriction to trade.
As for the fact that it has to be "necessary for the protection of animal, plant or
human life or health", it leaves much room for interpretation. In the case that the
interpretation used in GATT was to be used by a NAFTA panel , the measure taken
should be the least inconsistent with NAFTA, in case there are other possible measures.
In the case that an implemented measure is inconsistent with NAFTA and an alternative
measure, consistent with the agreement, exists, a dispute settlement could be brought.
As for the "to the extent necessary"provision, this means that the sanitary and
phytosanitary measures may only be applied to the extent that they are necessary to




The only in its territory provision determines that sanitary and phytosanitary
measures will not have any effect outside the Parties' territories. Therefore, an important
denial of provisions with extrajurisdictional effects is clearly demonstrated here,
something that is congruent with the Parties' (especially Mexico and Canada) concern
over sovereignty issues.
The fourth requisite establishes that the measure must be based on scientific
principles and risk assessment. Therefore, for a measure to be able to withstand a dispute
settlement, it must be based in some scientific proof and risk assessment. Hence, a
Such international standards include the ones set by Codex Alimentarius, the International Office of
Epizootics, the International Plant Protection Convention and the North American Plant Protection
Organization.
34
See JOHNSON & BEAULIEU, supra note 1, at 76-78. Even though, the authors argue that the GATT
interpretation, difficult to support an environmental law, should have no bearing in a NAFTA's panel
decision, and the text as a whole should be taken in consideration for a proper interpretation.
35 Mat 83.
20
measure that comes out from an irrational reason or public fears will not survive a dispute
settlement, something that is obviously correct. The problem here is that the
precautionary principle
36 may not be taken in consideration, since there are many
environmental issues that do not have a real, totally demonstrated, scientific basis. Thus,
a measure that attends one of these environmental issues will probably not survive a
challenge.
Finally, sanitary and phytosanitary measures may not constitute a disguised
restriction to trade. It must be noticed that the language used in this provision would
allow, in case of a literal interpretation, that a measure that is not "disguised" but affects
17
trade could not be challenged .
Chapter Nine
Chapter Nine, called "Technical Barriers to Trade" is similar to Chapter Seven, but
it applies to the standards and technical regulations that are not sanitary or phytosanitary
measures, and are established to accomplish a legitimate objective, such as protection of
TO
the environment and sustainable development .
As in Chapter Seven, each Party is free to establish its own levels of protection,
concerning its legitimate objectives of safety or the protection of human, animal or plant
life or health, the environment or the consumers
39
. Even though, while adopting such
levels it must avoid arbitrary and unjustifiable distinctions between similar goods and
services if these distinctions result in arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination, constitute a












As in Chapter Seven, dispute settlements may be brought against those levels or
protection or, more likely, against the measures implemented to reach those levels. Even
though, there are fewer restrictions for environmental provisions than in Chapter Seven.
The measures must be related (but not necessary as in Chapter Seven) to safety, the
protection of human, animal or plant life or health, the environment or the consumers .
Besides, they must not be an unnecessary obstacle to trade, something that can be
proved if the measure's demonstrable purpose is to achieve a legitimate objective and if




An important requirement of Chapter Seven that is not included in Chapter Nine is
the scientific basis and risk assessment. Therefore, since it is easier to defend an
environmental provision under Chapter Nine, "the party complained against would do
well to ensure that a challenged law or regulation is not classified as [a sanitary or
phytosanitary] measure."
4
It must be noticed that, even if an environmental provision manages to pass the
requirements of chapters seven and nine, a complaining party may still argue that the




, in order to bring up nullification or impairment. Unfortunately for
environmental concerns, this provision is too vague and ambiguous, since it is difficult to






See JOHNSON & BEAULIEU, supra note 1 , at 95.
44 NAFTA, supra note 32, Annex 2004(1).
Johnson and Beaulieu think that this would mean that "a party that bargained for a tariff concession may
reasonably expect that the granting party would not subsequently adopt a purportedly environment-related
measure whose real purpose or underlying intent is to defeat the purpose of such concession". See
JOHNSON & BEAULIEU, supra note 1, at 99.
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Finally, it must be noticed that the measures that can be challenged under NAFTA
must affect (or have the possibility to affect, directly or indirectly) trade. Therefore, only




NAFTA 's Chapter Eleven, which refers to foreign direct investment (or FDI for this
paper's effects), is also extremely important to analyze for environmental concerns, since
both the text and the cases which have arisen from these provisions may imply a greater
risk for green goals than the rest of the NAFTA package.
It must be noticed that NAFTA is the "first comprehensive investment regime
between countries at different stages of development" . These different levels of
development go far beyond the economic aspect, since they also comprehend different
levels of environmental protection and legal frameworks.
It is curious that during the NAFTA negotiations, as we have seen, much attention
was paid to the enforcement of environmental laws, trying to prevent pollution havens
and "race to the bottom" lowering of standards, but not much care was provided by
environmentalists to the possible negative effects of this specific chapter ofNAFTA48 .
The NAFTA negotiations, concerning investment issues, focused on the protection
of investments, of investor security, especially since Mexico does not have a very good
history concerning the protection of FDI, something that former President Salinas tried to
change. Concerning environmental issues, as we have seen, the negotiations were quite
more concerned with the enforcement of the respective national environmental laws and
trying to impede pollution havens and "race to the bottom" standards. The possible
46 NAFTA, supra note 32, arts. 701 and 901
.
47 MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 14, at 3.
Id., at 3.
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consequences of Chapter Eleven and its interpretation were not properly addressed, and
nowadays, as we will see, these may constitute one of the major dangers for green
interests, since they have been used plenty of times to challenge the host country's
environmental laws and administrative decisions.
Chapter Eleven has presented with all probability the aforementioned negative
(concerning green goals) effects of FDI. While providing investors with a much-required
security, they have brought unpredictability and uncertainty to environmentalists.
The following table registers the known cases brought under Chapter Eleven. The
suits go from amounts often to seven hundred and fifty million dollars







SignaS.A. deC.V. Canada Impact of administrative drug approval process on an investor
Ethyl Corp. Canada Import ban on gasoline additive MMT for environmental
purposes
Metalclad Corp. Mexico State and municipal actions allegedly preventing the location
of a hazardous waste facility
Desona de C.V. Mexico Alleged breach of contract to operate a landfill
Marvin Feldman Mexico Unknown
USA Waste ("Acaverde") Mexico Believed related to landfill activities
S.D. Myers Canada Temporary ban on PCB waste exports
Loewen Group Inc. United States Award against company following allegedly biased civil court
proceeding
Sun Belt Water Inc. Canada Allegedly biased treatment by provincial government of US
partner in a joint water-export venture
Pope & Talbot Canada Allegedly discriminatory export quotas to implement the US-




The investor-state dispute settlement process contains an impressive set of rights
and remedies for investors, who may use these against environmental provisions. This
process has caused many environmentalists to worry, and for good reasons. There are two
main causes for this concern
50
. The first of them is that the process of Chapter Eleven
allows foreign investors to escape national procedural or public interest safeguards, "in
favor of non-transparent, secretive system of arbitration with no right to appeal"
51
. In the
case of American, or Canadian investors -since it is not so feasible that many Mexican
investors would exist-, they would be free of the specially cumbersome process of
Mexican tribunals. Besides the dilemma of a secretive dispute resolution system, there
are other problems; for example, an issue of sovereignty could be raised here: in order for
the sovereignty of a country to prevail, it is required that all national remedies available
to a plaintiff should have been pursued before attending to international instances... a
basic principle of international law . Arbitration in this case would pose a major danger
to such principle.
A second cause for concern to environmentalists would be that the consent of the
parties is not required to initiate the dispute settlement process . This fosters the
previously commented problem that private interests are protected at the expense of
environmental protection and other goals that involve a public interest, such as health
issues, affecting legal provisions even before they have been adopted. As Howard Mann
comments
54
, the history of Chapter Eleven has proved that its provisions have even
changed from the original purpose of protecting investors to an offensive tool provided to
them. The fact that initiating a suit is not very expensive and a lack of clarity on the
50
See Id., at 6.
51
Id. at 6.
Even the NAAEC recognizes this, in its article 14 (2), requiring the submitter to extinguish the available
national remedies at hand.
53
See MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 14,at 15.
* See Id., at 17.
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interpretation of the provisions allow the investors to make an abuse of what was
originally a simple right of protection.
As with chapters seven and nine, a lack of clarity and ambiguity of the text provides
for a greater uncertainty about the scope and interpretation of the same. For example, the
definition of "measures" subject to review is extremely broad, as is the case of the
definition of investor and investment. For the first of them, we may find that it includes
both binding and non-binding acts, including even court decisions and government
statements of any kind that could possibly affect an investor's interests.
As for the definition of investor, this includes minor shareholders, some bond
holders and certain passive investors, who may start a dispute settlement process even
without the company's consent. As Howard Mann suggests55 , this may generate with
time that national companies try to acquire a foreign component in order to escape the
national procedures and have access to the extraordinary rights and remedies of Chapter
Eleven.





most favored nation treatment;
minimum international standard of treatment;
prohibitions against certain performance requirements on investors, and
provisions governing expropriation.
We will now proceed to comment these issues, to which the three Parties must
adhere and that are of a primordial importance for the analysis of Chapter Eleven and the
danger it poses to environmental protection.
55
See Id, at 17-18.
56
See Id., at 19.
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National Treatment and Most Favored Nation' .
These standards require a host country to treat an investor from another Party in no
less favorable terms than it would treat national investors or investors from another
country. This seems to be rather clear, but in practice, it raises two major questions"
8
.
The first one is: what does "no less favorable" mean to an environmental regulator?
Must a foreign investor receive a treatment equal to the best one any company receives,
or only an average treatment? In a related case, a foreign investor argued that, even if
there were no national companies that produced its product (a gasoline additive), an
import ban on the same violated his rights, since he would be receiving a less favorable
treatment than national companies would have received if they existed.
The second question is: are there any legitimate reasons for treating a foreign
investor differently? The '"no less favorable" treatment is to be bestowed under "like
circumstances", but this is especially difficult to define in long-term investments. In the
case where the air pollutant limit -according to national laws- has been achieved,
forbidding a foreign investor to establish a facility in the area, would there be like
circumstances with regard to the other national companies established there? It would be
difficult to define.
Minimum standard oftreatment in accordance with international /om'"
9
.
This requires some basic international standards to be met. such as due process and
an access to justice, implying fair and equitable treatment and full protection and
" NAFTA, supra note 32. articles 1 102. 1 103.
58
See MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 14. at 25.
59 NAFTA, supra note 32. article 1 105.
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security. Though in some cases this may pose a danger to environmental concerns
60
, it is
the least troublesome of the present issues, even if some decisions may be lost for green
goals, especially in Mexico where the environmental laws are still under development,
allowing many "legal lagoons" which would lead to judicial decisions that could be
easily challenged by these means.
Performance requirements.
These forbid governments from imposing certain requirements on investors, such as
prohibitions to export a certain amount of the output of a company or demand the transfer
of a particular technology as a condition for the investment to proceed. There is an
exception for the measures that are considered "necessary" to protect human, animal or
plant life or health or to preserve natural resources. Even though, we here deal again with
the problem of the definition of "necessary", as seen before during the analysis of
Chapter Seven. The issue here is one of mere interpretation: "[...] establish when a type
of regulation does not constitute a performance requirement, as opposed to when it might




This is perhaps the issue that has received the uttermost public attention, due to the
dangers it presents to environmental regulation. Article 1110 of NAFTA establishes that
"[n]o Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of an
60
See MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 14, at 32.
61 NAFTA, supra note 32, article 1 106.
62 MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 14, at 36.
63 NAFTA, supra note 32, article 1110.
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investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to nationalization or
expropriation of such an investment, except: (a) for a public purpose; (b) on a
nondiscriminatory basis; (c) in accordance with due process of law and Article 1 105(1);
and (d) on payment of compensation..."
64
.
This article serves to protect investors from unfair expropriation of their properties
or measures that have the same effect, such as removal of directors or excessive taxation.
The major problem with this article is that it may be used against measures that regulate
commercial activity in order to protect the environment or human health and safety. This
is of particular importance for environmental measures that have an impact on land and
property use.
What would come out of all this? We could find that a regulatory freeze would be
generated, since no government would be willing to establish measures that would bring
a payment for compensation. As Howard Mann comments, this would "amount to
taxpayers' money being required to pay for the right of a government to protect the
environment, an entirely perverse result in light of the ascendancy of the polluter-pays




Finally, to end with the analysis of Chapter Eleven, we must comment that another
issue that can -and currently is- affecting environmental goals and that has generated a
common mistrust from environmentalists is the procedure itself, involving what is called
a "cone of silence". Governments are not required to disclose the information of the
various stages of the process and can even keep the final award of the same a secret.
64
Id., article 1110.
65 MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 14, at 46.
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This lack of transparency is aggravated by two factors
66
. The first one is the scope
and main purpose ofNAFTA, which will, with all certainty, conduct to a situation where,
helped by the ambiguity of the agreement, many cases will go beyond common
commercial disputes, affecting basic issues of public policy.
The second factor is that the secrecy of the process and related negotiations will
lead to an affection of a much required -for green concerns- democratic legitimacy of the
process. This "democratic" issue is a fundamental requirement of many issues related to
environmental purposes, such as the one of sustainable development, which has as a basic
principle the participation of the diverse stakeholders concerning issues of broad public
interest, such as the environment, health and safety.
International Agreements
NAFTA establishes that, if there exists a discrepancy between the provisions of
NAFTA and the obligations of some international agreements that are listed in the text,
the latter will prevail
67
. Said agreements include the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and the Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste and their Disposal, which are trade-
related international environmental agreements. The Agreement between Canada and the
United States of America Concerning the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste
and the Mexico-United States Agreement to Cooperate in the Solution of Environmental
Problems in the Border Area are also included. One could think that, if the obligations of
these agreements prevail over NAFTA, then the measures taken to comply with them
would not be susceptible to dispute settlements under the last mentioned agreement. This
Id., at 55.
67 NAFTA, supra note 32, art. 104 (1).
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is not true, since the measures taken must be the least inconsistent with NAFTA, in case
that there is more than one possible measure.
Pollution Havens
Including one of the most important concerns of environmentalists, the issue of
possible pollution havens, NAFTA establishes that countries should not encourage
investment by relaxing or derogating domestic health, safety or environmental
measures
68
. Even though, as can be seen by the use of the word "should"' instead of
"shall", this is an unenforceable provision, therefore with no real force
69
.
So, as it could be seen in this and the former chapters, environmental issues were
taken into consideration probably just to stop the complaints of NGOs at that time.
Unfortunately, this consideration was not enough, and environmental groups sought to
get an answer for their petitions, which most of them thought would be taken into account
in the side agreement. Nevertheless, although one cannot say that NAFTA is an
agreement with a purpose for greening economic activities, it must be remembered that it
is still a trade agreement, and as such, one will not find any antecedents that consider








The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), as seen
on Chapter Two, tries (or at least pretends to try) to incorporate the environmental issues
raised mainly by NGOs after the first draft ofNAFTA was completed. In this Chapter we
will make a brief resume and analysis of its main provisions.
Objectives and obligations
Article one of NAAEC establishes the objectives of the agreement, which include:
foster the protection of the environment in the territories of the parties, promote
sustainable development, support the environmental objectives and goals of NAFTA,
increase cooperation between the parties to protect the environment and develop and
improve environmental provisions, enhance enforcement of environmental laws and
regulations, promote transparency and public participation in the development of
environmental provisions and promote pollution prevention policies and practices.
As one can see, these objectives are related to the concerns of the environmental
groups, mentioned in chapters one and two. But the concerns of other groups of interest,
mainly business companies and the pro-economic factions of the governments, also
appear in this article's objectives: avoid creating trade distortions or new trade barriers
and promote economically efficient and effective environmental measures.
Even though, most of these objectives are just broad principles, and, with the
exception of the enforcement of environmental provisions, have no strength at all to force
the parties to comply with them.
31
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Article two establishes the general commitments of the parties, such as: prepare
public reports on the state of the environment, promote education on environmental
matters, assess environmental impacts and promote the use of economic instruments for
the achievement of environmental goals
70
. The parties shall also have to consider
implementing the recommendations of the Council related to the limits of certain
pollutants and shall consider prohibiting the export of a pesticide or toxic substance
whose use is prohibited within the party's territory
71
. The "shall consider'
1
demonstrates
how lax these provisions are, so that if the parties do not comply with them, no sanctions
may be brought.
Article three establishes, in a similar way to NAFTA, the right of the parties to
establish their own levels of environmental protection and to adopt or modify accordingly
its own levels of protection. The pollution havens issue is taken in consideration, since
the article provides that the parties shall ensure that their legal provisions provide for high
levels of environmental protection and shall continue to improve those provisions. Albeit,
these provisions are not considered to be enforceable.
Other articles of part two provide obligations of the parties related to the publication
of measures adopted or planned to ensure private access to remedies (being cautious
enough to not affect Mexican Law, that only enables citizens to have standing in court
when a direct harm is caused against them) and have adequate procedural guarantees.
Article five may be the most important one, since it establishes the sole obligation
that may be enforceable through the dispute settlement: the enforcement of laws and
regulations.
70
See North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sep. 8 1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex„ 32 I.L.M.,
[hereinafter NAAEC], art. 2(1).
71
Id., art. 2 (2)(3).
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The Commissionfor Environmental Cooperation (CEC)
Part three of the side agreement establishes the CEC, a ministerial commission just
like the Free Trade Commission. The three main components of the CEC are the Council,
the Secretariat and the Joint Public Advisory Committee.
The Council
The "political anchor of the CEC, its final authority and its direct link to the
parties"
72
, the Council comprises cabinet-level or equivalent representatives of the
parties, or their designees
73
. It, as the governing body of the CEC, has a list of functions,
which include, among others, the following
74
: oversee the Secretariat and the
implementation of the NAAEC, have a role in the dispute settlement procedure ,
strengthen the cooperation on the development and improvement of environmental laws
and regulations, prepare a review of the operation and effectiveness of NAAEC (within
four years of its entry into force) and encourage effective enforcement and technical
cooperation, cooperate with the NAFTA Free Trade Commission to achieve the
environmental goals and objectives of said agreement.
The Council also has to make some recommendations, and may make others.
Among the ones that it has to make are: appropriate limits for specific pollutants, public
access to information concerning the environment that is held by authorities and
recommendations on transboundary issues with a view to an agreement between the
72 JOHNSON & BEAULIEU, supra note 1, at 133.
73 NAAEC, supra note 70, art. 9(1).
74
Id., art 10.
The dispute settlement cannot proceed if there is no two-thirds vote of the Council to convene a panel.




. There are also some recommendations that the Council may make, such as
those related to pollution prevention techniques and strategies, exotic species that may be
harmful and the protection of endangered and threatened species.
One can see, based on the Council's functions, that in this part of NAAEC the
environmental objectives are quite broad, covering most environmental issues. Even
though, these objectives shall become more economic-related further on, as will be
contemplated in the dispute resolution analysis.
The Secretariat
The Secretariat is the real working horse of the CEC. Headed by an Executive
Director appointed by the Council for three years, its main functions are
7
: provide
technical, administrative and operational support to the Council, prepare an annual report
to be approved by the Council, prepare reports requested by the Council on any matters
that appear in the Program, prepare a report concerning any matter related to the
functions of NAAEC (unless the Council opposes it by a two-thirds vote) and accept
submissions of ineffective enforcement of environmental provisions that may lead to the
development of a factual record.
It is important to notice that the NAAEC tries to create a safeguard for a certain
independence of the Secretariat, by providing that the Executive Director and the staff
shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or authority external to the
Council . Even though, this has not been accomplished in reality, and the members of
the Secretariat do receive a certain influence from the government of their respective
countries.
' This is related to the agreement that establishes the BECC and NADBank. See supra note 28.
77 NAAEC, supra note 70, arts. 1 1-15.
78
See NAAEC, supra note 70, art. 1 1(4).
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Besides, the Secretariat has been the focus of a terrible political turmoil and
controversy. Up to this date, there are still many questions involving the faculties of the
Secretariat, especially for what concerns the interpretation of the NAAEC. Should the
Secretariat be the one to interpret it, or should this faculty belong to the Parties (hence, to
the Council, who would take decisions on interpretation issues by vote)? It is the opinion
of the author that the Secretariat cannot go beyond the expressly given faculties in the
NAAEC, affecting the interests of the involved Parties. As the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties determines, the interpretation of a treaty must be realized by the parties
themselves, since they cannot incur in obligations they did not intend to. Hence, the
interpretation would correspond to the Council, not to the Secretariat, as the latter has
often tried to do.
The Joint Public Advisory Committee
The Joint Public Advisory Committee (or JPAC) represents the presence of the
NGO community in the CEC. Its functions are mainly to provide advice to the Council
and technical, scientific or other information to the Secretariat. It does not have any real
kind of formal power on the decision-making of the CEC (that is left only to the
Council), which reflects that it may only exist to "calm down" the claims of the NGOs
during NAAEC s negotiations. Even though, the JPAC has proved to have a determined
political power, and may certainly exercise some influence over the decisions of the other
institutions.
The fact that the JPAC has the aforementioned political power has proved to be
more a drawback than an asset to the purposes of the agreement, due to the political
turmoil it generates, leading only to useless discussions.
79




Many environmental groups have criticized the CEC, mainly for the following
reasons: a) it lacks the necessary independence from the governments to be effective; b) it
is a "toothless" institution with no power and c) its procedures provide inadequate
transparency and public participation . While some believe in the efficiency of the
CEC 81 , thinking that the aforementioned critiques are not valid, the author prefers to
remain in a neutral position, seeing the CEC as it is in reality: a commission with no real
power to oblige NAFTA's parties to comply with their environmental provisions, existing
only as an institution that may help by providing recommendations and studies related to
its subject: the environment. Unlike the institution that most NGOs asked for, as will be
seen later on, it is a commission that relies entirely in the good will of the governments to
achieve any positive results. Besides, as we already commented, the ambiguity and
vagueness ofNAAEC's provisions have contributed to the Secretariat's prepotent attitude
of exercising faculties that were not given to it by the parties. Hence, we have a case of
institutions whose real powers and actions will have to be defined with time, with the
required consent of the three nations.
Reports and Submissions
Probably the most important functions of the Secretariat are the ones concerning
reports and submissions. In this manner, the Secretariat prepares annual reports,
secretariat reports, and the factual records in the case of submissions.
80
See Bolinger, supra note 30, at 1 125.
For an optimistic view of the CEC, see Magraw, supra note 69, at 136, "... the Commission wil
encourage and make more effective the enforcement of environmental laws and regulations".
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Annual Reports
The annual report is prepared by the Secretariat in accordance to the Council's
instructions, to which a draft must be submitted for review before the public release. This
report contains the activities and expenses of the CEC during the previous year, the
approved program and budget for the subsequent year; actions taken by the parties to
comply with the NAAEC, recommendations made on any matter related to the NAAEC,
submissions by persons and NGOs, state of the environment in the parties' territories and




The Secretariat may prepare a report of any subject within the scope of the annual
program
83
, or of any other environmental issue related to the NAAEC (which can be
quite about anything), unless the Council opposes by a two-thirds vote. These matters
may not include cases of failure of enforcement of environmental provisions. The report
shall be submitted to the Council and made public available within 60 days following the
submission, unless the Council decides otherwise .
82
See NAAEC, supra note 70, art. 12.
See Id, art. 13.
84
The only non-enforcement matter, and first controversy to be brought under NAAEC, was submitted by
two Mexican and one American NGOs, concerning the deaths of thousands of migratory birds at the Silva
Reservoir in Mexico. Curiously enough, it was filed accordingly to article 13, and not under article 14
(concerning enforcement issues). Several recommendations were given to the Mexican government, who
finally drained the reservoir to prevent a similar death. See Bolinger, supra note 30, at 1117-1118; see also
David Lopez, Dispute Resolution under NAFTA: Lessonsfrom the Early Experience, 32 Tex. Int'l L.J. 163,
188-189 (1997).
38
Submissions on enforcement matters
Articles 14 and 15 may be the most important provisions of the NAAEC, since they
contain the procedure of the submissions on enforcement matters, probably the only
procedure that has been demonstrated to be somehow effective. A submission on
enforcement matters is a "documented assertion that a Party to the [NAAEC] is failing to
or
effectively enforce its environmental law" . There have been twenty-three
submissions , of which six have been against the United States, eight against Canada and
nine against Mexico . The following table attends to such cases.
Table 2. Registry of submissions on enforcement matters.
Party Summary of the matter Date submission filed
USA Submitters allege that provisions of the "Rescissions Act" have
resulted in a failure to enforce effectively selected provisions of
the Endangered Species Act.
30 June 1995
USA Submitters allege that provisions of the "Rescissions Act" result
in a failure to enforce effectively all applicable Federal
environmental laws by eliminating private remedies for salvage
timber sales.
30 August 1995
Guidelines for Submissions on Enforcement Matters under Articles 14 and 15 of the North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation. §§ 1.1, Jun. 28 1999, Council Resolution 99/06 [hereinafter
Guidelines].
6
Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Registry of Submissions on Enforcement Matters (February
28, 2000) < http://www.cec.org/templates/RegisrryFront.cfm?&format=l&varlan=English>.
" As of March 2, 2000. The first submission was filed against the United States on June 30, 1995. It is
curious that on the first three years of the submissions (1995-1997), in which twelve of them were filed,
only two were against Mexico. The curiosity of all this is based on the fact that the NAAEC was brought
against Mexico's lack of enforcement of environmental laws. Even though, with the flow of time, Mexico
is likeable to be the party against which most submissions are filed, for reasons that will be explained
afterwards.
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Party Summary of the matter Date submission filed
Mexico Submitters allege that the appropriate authorities failed to
effectively enforce environmental laws during the evaluation
process of the project "Construction and Operation of a Public
Harbor Terminal for Tourist Cruises on the Island of Cozumel".
18 January 1996
Canada Submitter asserts that the governments of Canada and Alberta
have failed to effectively enforce their environmental laws
resulting in the pollution of specified wetland areas which
impacts on the habitat offish and migratory birds.
20 March 1996
Canada Submitter alleges that the Government of Canada is failing to
apply, comply with and enforce the habitat protection sections of
the Fisheries Act and with CEAA (Canadian Environmental
Assessment Act).
9 September 1996
USA Submitters allege that the United States of America is failing to
effectively enforce its environmental law, namely the National
Environmental Policy Act, with respect to the United States
Army's operation of Fort Huachuca, Arizona.
14 November 1996
Canada Submitters allege that the Canadian Government is failing to
enforce the Fisheries Act, and to utilize its powers pursuant to the
National Energy Board Act, to ensure the protection of fish and
fish habitat in British Columbia's rivers from ongoing and
repeated environmental damage caused by hydro-electric dams
2 April 1997
Mexico The Submitters allege that wastewater originating in the
municipalities of Imuris, Magdalena de Kino, and Santa Ana,
located in the Mexican state of Sonora, is being discharged into
the Magdalena River without prior treatment, contravening




Party Summary of the matter Date submission Filed
Canada Submitters allege the occurrence of failure to enforce several
environmental standards related to agriculture on the territory of
the Province of Quebec.
9 April 1997
Canada Submitter alleges that the Canadian government has failed to
enforce its law requiring environmental assessment of federal
initiatives, policies and programs. In particular, the Canadian
government failed to conduct an environmental assessment of
The Atlantic Groundfish Strategy (TAGS).
26 May 1997
Canada Submitters allege that Canada is failing to enforce its regulation
ratifying the Convention on Biological Diversity signed at the
Rio Earth Summit and subsequently ratified pursuant to an
Order-in-Council.
21 July 1997
Canada Submitter alleges that the Government of Canada is failing to
apply, comply with and enforce the habitat protection sections of
the Fisheries Act and with the Canadian Environmental
Assessment Act. In particular, a directive released by the
Department of Fisheries, which creates a decision making
process which frustrates the intention of Parliament and usurps
the role of CEAA as a planning and decision making tool.
4 October 1997
Mexico Submitters allege that the Competent Authorities have made
omissions in the enforcement of environmental legislation,
concerning the public complaint filed on 23 September 1996, in
regard to the Hydrological Basin of the Lerma Santiago River-
Lake Chapala.
10 October 1997
Mexico Submitters filed a submission with regard to the fact that the
Federal Attorney General and Federal Judiciary did not duly
enforce the General Law on Ecological Balance and
9 January 1998
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Party Summary of the matter Date submission Filed
Environmental Protection in relation to the explosions of April
22nd in the city of Guadalajara.
Mexico Submitter alleges procedural violations in the course of the
various procedures described in the Submission relating to
lumbering operations at the "El Taray" site in the state of Jalisco.
14 October 1997
USA Submitters "assert that the US EPA's regulations drafted and
programs adopted to control airborne emissions of dioxin/furan,
mercury and other persistent toxic substances from solid waste
and medical waste incinerators violate and fail to enforce both: 1)
US domestic laws, and; 2) the ratified US-Canadian treaties
designed to protect the Great Lakes that are partly referenced in
the US Clean Air Act.
27 May 1998
Canada Submission identifies the systemic failure of the Government of
Canada to enforce section 36(3) of the Fisheries Act to protect
fish and fish habitat from the destructive environmental impacts
of the mining industry in British Columbia.
29 June 1998
Mexico Submitters allege that the government of Mexico has failed to
effectively enforce the country's environmental legislation, by
having authorized the operation of a hazardous waste landfill less
than six kilometers away from Hermosillo. This, in violation of
Official Mexican Standard NOM-CPR-004ECOL/1993, that
establishes an appropriate distance of at least twenty-five
kilometers.
23 July 1998
Mexico Submission alleges that the United Mexican States is failing to
effectively enforce its environmental laws with respect to the
establishment and operation of a shrimp farm located in Isla del
Conde. The Submitters allege that the authorities have failed to
20 October 1998
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Party Summary of the matter Date submission filed
effectively enforce legal provisions for the protection ofjungles
and tropical rainforests, particularly as regards certain mangrove
and migratory bird species; environmental impact requirements;
wastewater discharge, and provisions for prevention and control
of water pollution and use; and provisions on fisheries and the
introduction of alien species.
Mexico Submitters allege that Mexico has failed to effectively enforce its
environmental law in connection with an abandoned lead smelter
in Tijuana, , that poses serious threats to the health of the
neighboring community, and to the environment.
23 October 1998
USA Submitters allege that the State of California and/or the United
States of America, has failed to enforce California's
environmental laws and regulations related to water resource
protection and to the regulation of underground storage tanks;
and the State of California has failed to properly protect water
resources by allowing gasoline to be released into the
environment from leaking tank and by not regulating all sources
of environmental contamination
18 October 1999
USA Submitters allege that the United States Government is failing to
effectively enforce Section 703 of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act
(MBTA), 16 U.S.C. §§703-712, which prohibits the killing of
migratory birds without a permit.
19 November 1999
Mexico Submitter asserts that the town of Cumpas, Sonora, Mexico, has
been affected by air pollution from the Molymex, S.A. de C.V.
plant which produces molybdenum trioxide from molybdenum
sulfide, allegedly in violation of the provisions of LGEEPA
regarding air quality and Official Mexican Standards for
environmental health that establish limits for S02 and PM10.
27 January 2000
43
What is the procedure for the submission on enforcement matters and factual
records? When a submission is filed with the Secretariat, it has to determine whether to
consider the submission and request a response, based on the requirements established in
article 14.
88
In case it meets the requirements, the Secretariat may request a response
from the complained Party, forwarding it a copy of the submission and other relevant
information. The Party shall answer after thirty days. Then, the Secretariat will consider,
based on the response, whether to request a factual record to the Council. If it does, the
Council will have to approve it with a two-thirds vote, after which the Secretariat may
commence with the preparation of the factual record and submit it to the Council. The
parties have forty-five days to provide comments related to the submitted draft. At last, a
final version of the document is submitted to the Council, and, in case of a two-thirds
vote in favor, it may be published.
How will the factual record be prepared and what does it contain? To prepare it89 ,
the Secretariat will attend to any information furnished by the Party, and may also
consider any relevant technical, scientific or other information: a) that is publicly
available, b) submitted by interested non-governmental organizations or persons, c)
submitted by the Joint Public Advisory Committee (JPAC), or d) developed by the
Secretariat or by independent experts.
The factual record shall contain
90
: a) a summary of the submission that initiated the
process, b) a summary of the response provided by the respective Party, c) a summary of
any other relevant factual information, d) facts presented by the Secretariat with respect
Among these, are the following: the submitter must be a person or an organization residing or
established in the territory of any party (something important, since due to the limited number and
importance of Mexican NGOs, an NGO of any Party can file the submission in case of a failure of
enforcement in Mexico); the submission must contain proof that the matter has been communicated to the
national authorities of the complained Party; the submission must appear to be aimed to promote
enforcement rather than a harassment of industry (here, the concerns of business groups were taken in
consideration); the Secretariat will consider if the submitter alleges harm to itself and whether the submitter
pursued private remedies available under the Party's law.
89
See Guidelines, supra note 85, § 1 1 . 1
.
90
See Id., § 12.
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to the matters raised in the submission, and e) in the case only of final factual records,
and as appropriate, comments of any Party.
It must be noticed that, regarding the publication of the factual record and related
documents, there have been several controversies, due in part to differences in the
national legal systems of the Parties for what concerns confidentiality and privacy issues.
Even if both the NAAEC and its guidelines for articles 14 and 15 do attend to these
issues, it is almost a fact that their provisions will have to be improved, since problems
continue to arise, especially for what concerns cases where Parties complain that
confidential information has been or could be made publicly available, in case a
submission prospers.
It must be noticed that the submissions on enforcement matters may be brought
against any failure to enforce, whether it affects trade or not, but does not imply by itself
that the complained party shall be sanctioned, although it could serve as the basis for a
dispute settlement (in case there are trade-related consequences).
This kind of submissions has been the only procedure related to enforcement
applied until now, and the situation is likely to remain like that
91
, for the difficulties that
exist in the dispute settlement procedure.
One of the most important and controversial submissions filed with the Secretariat
was the one that involved the construction of the Cozumel pier . The Island of Cozumel,
located eighteen kilometers Northeast from the Yucatan Peninsula, has become a major
attraction for tourists, situation that caused the existent international pier to be
insufficient for the number of people that came to visit it. Hence, a project for a new pier
"Citizen and non-governmental organization submissions to the CEC have been the only enforcement
mechanisms of the NAAEC to be applied thus far and will likely be the most used and effective means of
ensuring future enforcement of environmental laws for two reasons. First, these submissions do not require
governmental action to challenge ineffective enforcement of environmental laws. [...] Second, citizen
submissions are likely to be more common in the future because of the bulk and length of the country to
country dispute resolution process." Aaron Holland, The NAAEC: The Effect ofNAFTA on the Enforcement
of United States Environmental Laws, 28 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 1219, 1249 (1997).
92
CEC, Submission SEM-96-001, filed on January 18, 1996.
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was developed, but even when many other places could have been used for its
construction, a site next to the Paradise reef, one of the most important reefs of the world,
was selected
93
. Several legal anomalies were detected in the evaluation of the
environmental impact assessment, process that started prior to the NAAEC.
Some of these irregularities, that the submitters allege to invoke article 14 (for non-
enforcement of environmental provisions) are the following: the impact assessment was
not presented for the totality of the works included in the project, in violation of Mexican
General Law of Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental Protection94 ; the project was
made in a place considered to be a zone of refugee for maritime fauna and flora, in
violation of two legal provisions
95
, and it did not comply with the requirements of the
concession title awarded by the Secretariat of Communication and Transportation. The
Secretariat decided to require the Mexican Government a response, accordingly to article
14 of NAAEC. Being this the first time that Mexico received such a requirement (before
there had been only one submission, but under article 13), the national authorities were,
perhaps, overly concerned, since after all, there is no sanction under the submission and
an almost laughable possibility of the subject going to a dispute settlement. In its
response, some important topics were raised by the Mexican Government: the possibility
of retroactive application of NAAEC and the lack of legal capacity of the submitters
(since in Mexico, in order to have legal standing before the courts, a person must prove
that he has suffered a direct injury
96
, something almost impossible in a case of non-
See Luis Vera Morales, El Nuevo Muelle de Cozumel: Una Mirada Critica a la Evaluation de sus
Impactos Ambientales desde el Punto de Vista Juridico, 241 (1996).
94
Ley General del Equilibrio Ecologico y la Protection al Ambiente, D.O. January 28, 1988, modified on
D.O., December 13, 1996. Hereinafter LGEEPA.
95
Decreto que establece la Declaratoria de Zona de Refugio para la Flora y la Fauna Marinas de la Costa
Occidental de la Isla de Cozumel, D.O. June 11, 1980, and Decreto de Declaratoria de Usos, Destinos y
Reservas del Municipio de Cozumel.
The Mexican Constitution does not allow a citizen suit system; even though, there is a public
denunciation in many environmental-related laws, that allows citizens to inform the government of any
possible violation with the legal provisions.
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enforcement of environmental laws). The Secretariat decided that the agreement could be
applied retroactively if the effects of the action were still existent, and concluded that,
even if a submitter did not have standing before the Mexican courts, he could still file the
submission of non-enforcement
97
. Finally, a factual record was published
8
.
What is the obvious problem with the submission procedure of non-enforcement? It
relies too much on the good will of the parties, and of the influence that public opinion
(due to the publication of factual records) may generate in the different governments.
Regrettably, in the case of Mexico, the concern with public opinion may not be strong
enough to oblige the national authorities to enforce the environmental provisions,
especially if economical reasons lie in-between. Hence, the publication of a Factual
Record, that only contains an objective evaluation and description of the issues stated by
the submitter and the complained party and not any judgement or remedy, will only have
as a remedial power the ability to shame the government of that nation".
Finally, for what concerns the submissions of articles 14 and 15, it must be noticed
that Mexico is in a position that reflects an enormous disadvantage, especially in regard
to the United States. As we have see above, it is extraordinarily difficult to have legal
standing in environmental-related cases before the Mexican Courts, since the plaintiffs
should have suffered a direct injury in order for that to happen. In order for all the process
of the factual record to proceed, the national private remedies would have had to be
pursued before the plaintiffs could present the submission.
In Mexico, for the vast majority of cases, the only "legal remedy" a person or NGO
may have in case of a violation to an environmental provision, where no direct harm to
See David G. Schiller, Great Expectations: The North American Commission on Environmental
Cooperation, Review of the Cozumel Pier Submission, 28 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 437, 459-473
(1997).
The Mexican Government has taken actions to correct its reported violations of legal provisions and has
tried to provide for the security of the Paradise Rift. Unfortunately, Consortium H, the company in charge
of the project, decided to take the issue to the courts, were the situation has not been decided to this date.
9 Raymond MacCallum, Evaluating the Citizen Procedure under the NAAEC, 8 Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. &
Pol'y 395, 402 (1997).
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the person or NGO has occurred, is the "denuncia popular" (public complaint) ° , which
has many limitations.
This public complaint is filed with the Federal Attorney General for Environmental
Protection (PROFEPA, an organism that depends of the Ministry of Environment,
Natural Resources and Fisheries, hereinafter SEMARNAP). This complaint is lodged for
any incident, act or omission within the federal government's jurisdiction, that harms, or
may harm, the environment or natural resources. The persons filing the complaint must
provide their name and address and sufficient information to locate the source of the
complaint. If there is no PROFEPA in the locality, the complaint may be filed with
municipal authorities. In the case of presentation of two or more complaints for the same
facts, those shall be accumulated in a single file. The complaint may even be filed by
telephone, although the accuser shall need to ratify it in writting in the next three days.
The accuser may bring in evidence, documents and information related to the case in
hand.
PROFEPA may collaborate with universities, NGOs, and research centers to
produce studies and expert reports related to complaints. Upon receiving the complaint,
PROFEPA has 1 working days in which to inform the complainant of the actions that it
is taking to verify the complaint.
The main problem with the public complaint is that the outcome of such procedure
is only a non-binding, voluntary recommendation emitted by PROFEPA to the competent
authority, who may decide to not pay any attention to such notice, and leave the issue
unsolved. Even if the public complaint may open the door for other remedies, such as the
appeal of review or amparo, this only happens when an illegal act has been made during
the procedure of public complaint, affecting the constitutional rights of the complainant
to a legal procedure. If there are no violations of procedure, the public complaint is the
only private remedy available in Mexico, since there are no citizen suits available, as
commented above.
100 LGEEPA, supra note 94, arts. 189-204.
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Hence, whereas in the United States years must be spent in a long and expensive
judicial process to exhaust the available national remedies and allow the system of
submissions of articles 14 and 15 to proceed, in Mexico it may be just a few days and a
small amount of money to allow any person or NGO to have access to these
submissions
101
. This may bring with time that an enormous amount of submissions arise
against Mexico, many more than the ones that could be filed against the Unites States.
Even if this may prove to be an advantage for environmental goals, it is not for national
interests, since the submissions have demonstrated to carry an unfortunately immense
political content, which brings more gossip and turmoil than real solutions.
Dispute settlement
The NAAEC has a so-called dispute settlement procedure that, to this date, has
never been used, due to the fact that since its birth it seemed to be a weak legal provision,
only created probably to calm down the claims of NGOs and Congress during the
negotiations and in order for NAFTA to be ratified.
To bring up a dispute settlement, which can only be brought for matters related to
trade of goods or services , the complaining party must allege that there is a persistent
pattern of failure by other party to effectively enforce its environmental laws
103
. This
single phrase is the cause of most of the NAAEC 's problems related to the use of
economic sanctions for failure to enforce environmental provisions.
First of all, it is difficult to determine when there has been a persistent pattern of
failure of enforcement, since most certainly no Party has a hundred percent enforcement
of its laws. In fact, even in the United States compliance problems are common. Most
101
See RAQUEL GUTIERREZ NAJERA, INTRODUCTION AL ESTUDIO DEL DERECHO
AMBIENTAL, 137(1998).




American lawyers consider that to achieve full compliance with environmental laws is
impossible, due to the cost, complexity or uncertainty of their interpretation, situation
proved by a survey of corporate counsel that finds out that two-thirds recognize to have
recently violated the environmental laws,
104
. Besides, the fact that government agencies
are some of the most notorious polluters and that authorities enjoy a considerable
discretion in deciding whether to initiate or not enforcement proceedings, certainly
contributes to the problem
105
.
Second, the meaning and scope of environmental laws must be established
6
. Does
it include also judicial decisions? How about Official Mexican Standards, that are not by
themselves laws or regulations? Furthermore, there is an exception for laws that have as a
primary purpose the management of commercial harvest or exploitation, or subsistence or
aboriginal harvesting of natural resources, since no dispute settlement can be brought
against their lack of enforcement. As can be expected, it is sometimes difficult to
determine whether the main purpose of a provision is the management of natural
resources or if it is an environmental control issue, increasing the difficulty of
determining the extent of the meaning of environmental law under the agreement.
Third, there are two exceptions that literally kill the dispute settlement procedure:
there is no failure to enforce if the action or inaction of the authorities involved a) reflects
a reasonable exercise of their discretion in respect of investigatory, prosecutional,
regulatory or compliance manners, or b) results from bona fide decisions to allocate




NAEEC, art. 45 (2) establishes what must be understood for "environmental law". It determines that an
environmental law is any statute or regulation of a party , or provision thereof, which has as a primary
purpose the protection of the environment or prevention of a danger to human health or life, through: a) the
prevention, abatement or control of the release, discharge or emission of pollutants or environmental
contaminants, b) the control of environmentally hazardous or toxic chemicals, substances, materials and
wastes, and the dissemination of information related thereto, and c) the protection of wild flora and fauna,
including endangered species, their habitat, and specially protected natural areas in the Party's territory, but
does not include any statute regulation or provision, directly related to worker safety or health.
50
resources to enforcement in respect of other environmental matters determined to have
higher priorities.
Discretion is an important factor that the authorities in the three countries possess,
due to the aforementioned statement that total enforcement of laws is impossible. This
makes the exception to the dispute settlement a very general one, which could be applied
in most of the possible cases. If this was not enough, the second exception certainly
renders the dispute settlement of NAAEC as an useless procedure. The fact of budget
limits, especially in Mexican authorities, could be invoked in any case, and the bona fide
issue is extremely hard to prove.
108
The arbitral process begins after the disputing parties have engaged in
consultations, and, in case of failure, a special session of the Council may be requested,
in which the Council shall make recommendations or refer the conflict to another tribunal
(as GATT or NAFTA Trade Commission). If the efforts fail, a panel may be requested.
After the determination of the panel, the parties must agree upon a resolution of the
dispute, which may be based on the panel's recommendation. If there is no resolution, the
panel may establish its own plan or impose a fine or monetary enforcement assessment.
In the case of Canada, if it fails to pay the fine, the CEC will file the panel
determination in a Canadian Court, which then becomes an enforceable order.
109
107 NAAEC, supra note 70, art. 45 (l)(a) and (b).
Even though, David G. Schiller has a more optimistic view of the situation, claiming that it remains
feasible and meaningful, due to the purpose ofNAAEC to encourage Mexico to improve its enforcement of
environmental laws. See Schiller, supra note 97, at 454.
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See Glick, supra note 24, at 1 1 1-1 12.
CHAPTER FIVE
EFFECTS OF THE NAFTA PACKAGE IN MEXICO
What have been, if any, the effects of the NAFTA package in environmental-related
issues in Mexico, the party for which NAAEC was created in order to coerce it to enforce
its environmental laws? It is difficult to say if the facts described in this chapter are an
effect of the NAFTA package or not. The truth is that, in the years after NAFTA, changes
have been felt in Mexico, especially in a recent consideration of Environmental Law as a
young and important branch of law.
Even if many people consider Environmental Law to be a new issue in Mexico, it
must be noticed that the actual General Law of Ecological Equilibrium and
Environmental Protection was enacted in 1988, and prior to it there were two
environmental laws
110
, enacted in 1971 and 1982
111
, even if these were extremely general
provisions that did not attend environmental problems with an holistic point of view.
Hence, Environmental Mexican Law is not a new invention as to allege that its lack of
enforcement comes from the fact of its novelty, and that it is reasonable that such
situation would improve with time.
The aforementioned General Law was substantially modified, and several issues
that appear in the NAAEC were included in it, as in other Federal provisions. Even
though, many of these modifications are not consistent with the legal system of Mexico.
We shall now see some of these legal issues.
1,0
See RAUL BRANES, MANUAL DE DERECHO AMBIENTAL MEXICANO, 102 (1994).




The Federal Law ofMetrology and Standardization of 1992
This law was enacted in 1992, taking in consideration many environmental
concerns, although the main purpose of the law is a commercial one, being the Secretariat
of Commerce and Industrial Development the main authority in the standardization
process. A peculiar juridical instrument is established with this law: the Official Mexican
Standard, which may establish, among other things, environmental specifications.
The creation of these instruments involves a process in which the general public
may participate (if only to give suggestions with regard to the draft of the document) 1
and the final document, of a compulsory character, is generally published by the diverse
administrative units of the competent secretariats.
This is a major problem concerning the Mexican legal system, since these
provisions have the characteristics of regulations (specifying what is in a law) and
therefore contradict the Constitution, which establishes that only the President has the
faculty to emit regulations, being such faculty not a delegable one.
Most of the Official Mexican Standards related to environmental issues are
generally competence of the Secretariat of Environment, Natural Resources and
Fisheries, but there are other secretariats that may have competence in environmental
issues, such as the Secretariat of Health or the Secretariat of Agriculture, Cattle-raising
and Rural Development.
What have been the effects of these spirit of standardization, that (in the
environmental issues) strives to establish in a developing country similar standards than
those in the United States and Canada? The result has been a chaos of provisions, that
often contradict each other and that are so extensive in number that not even the
authorities possess a reliable catalog of them all. This situation obviously leads to the
lack of enforcement of environmental laws, if these provisions are considered as such.
Therefore, it is consistent with one of the objectives of NAAEC: promoting public participation in the
development of environmental laws, regulations and policies.
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Modification ofthe General Law ofEcological Equilibrium and Environmental
Protection
After NAAEC, the General Law, originally enacted on 1988, was amended in
December 1996. The amends are strictly related, in most parts, to NAAEC's objectives
and to the issues raised by it, such as the aforementioned Cozumel pier submission.
In this sense, the amends introduce into the General Law of Ecological Equilibrium
and Environmental Protection, hereinafter LGEEPA, some new concepts, such as
environmental self-audits, economic instruments, clarification of the popular
denunciation and of the environmental impact statement to facilitate access to the public




Although this has been a most enthusiastic process to improve environmental laws,
the fact that most of these legal instruments and procedures have been copied from the
American legal system cannot be taken lightly. It has created a major rupture with the
juridical system in Mexico and contradictions with other laws, such as the General Law
of Health or the Law of Oil.
It must be noticed that the LGEEPA contains an article that states that, whenever
another law contradicts the LGEEPA, the latter shall prevail. Unfortunately, according to
the Mexican Constitution all federal laws have the same hierarchy, and, therefore, such
provision can be contradicted. Evidently, this shall generate problems in the enforcement
of environmental laws, since the authorities will have to decide between two provisions
that can be applied, with opposed results
114
. Hence, a most curious situation appears
under NAAEC: in any case a complaining party may bring a dispute settlement for non-
113
See GUTIERREZ NAJERA, supra note 101, at 133-146.
This shall be influenced by the economic importance of a certain law; for example, in case of a
contradiction between the LGEEPA and the Law of Oil, it is almost an axiom that the latter shall be
applied, due to the importance of the exploitation of such natural resource in Mexico's economy.
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enforcement. This situation is obviously absurd, and Mexican legislators should attend to
it as soon as possible.
The maquiladoras issue
A major concern of the United States has always been the problems of pollution
along the border area. Has NAAEC contributed to the improvement of the environmental
enforcement and abatement of pollution along this area? According to Bradly Mall
115
,
this is not the case. On the contrary, even if proponents ofNAFTA and the establishment
of the BECC and NADBank suggested an increase investment in environmental cleanup
and a decline of concentration of maquiladoras along the border, the opposite situation
has occurred
116
, due to the economic problems that Mexico has confronted in the last
years and NADBAnk's inefficiency to provide funding to projects related to
environmental cleanup.
The decline of the peso has caused the increased costs of pollution control systems,
which must be imported, hence undermining Mexico's ability to invest in health and
environmental infrastructure. Therefore, concerning border pollution problems, it can be
said that extralegal situations have caused the NAAEC to prove itself ineffective, at least
concerning this issue.
'
' Bradly Mall, The Effect ofNAFTA 's Environmental Provisions on Mexican and Chilean Policy, 32 Int'l
Law, 153, 171-175(1998).
See Id., at 174. In fact, the maquiladora industry has increased more than 20 percent, increasing the
problems along the border.
CHAPTER SIX
COMPARISON WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION.
For the purposes of this paper, it would be useful to compare the NAFTA package
with another trade block, such as the European Union, even if the latter may have an
essentially different nature and characteristics . Despite the differences, in both
economic blocks the relationship between trade and environment has had a major impact,
though they have been attended to at a different time of their existence
118
. After all,
perhaps by analyzing another model we may take some legal borrowings to elaborate a
more adequate and suggestive conclusion to this paper.
So, the purpose of this chapter will be to briefly analyze the protection of the
environment, as related to trade, in the European Community treaties and legislation, and
make a comparison -when applicable- with what is happening with NAFTA.
Taking in consideration that such purpose is quite complex, we shall address the
issue in very general terms, since it would certainly require a much more exhaustive
investigation than the extent of this chapter allows, since the paper is dedicated, after all,
to an analysis of the environmental effects of the NAFTA package.
NAFTA only establishes a free trade area, with no further implications of union or affection of
sovereignty. The European Community's integration is far broader, with more ambitious objectives,
creating a free market area, with free movement of workers and persons, institutions that elaborate common
legislation, and by removing barriers to trade and creating a zone of external customs.
While the environmental issues were discussed during the negotiations of NAFTA, leading later on to
the elaboration of an environmental side agreement, the European Community incorporated them years




The Treaty establishing the European Community (hereinafter EC Treaty), just as
NAFTA, attends to the issue of environmental problems, as related to trade and other
connected economic topics. The broad provisions of both documents seem to be quite
similar, as we will now see.
If we take a look at the general objectives of both the EC Treaty and the NAFTA
documents, we may find some particular similarities. The Treaty of Maastricht
incorporates into the objectives of the European Union the "...promotion of] economic
and social progress and... to achieve sustainable development..."
119
. Meanwhile,
NAFTA itself also recognizes the environmental issues. In its preamble, as we have seen,
it states that the governments of the three parties are resolved to: "undertake each of the
preceding [purposes] in a manner consistent with environmental protection and
conservation"; "promote sustainable development", and "strengthen the development and
enforcement of environmental laws and regulations." Up to here, it would seem that
NAFTA is more environmentally oriented than the EC Treaty, but the latter goes further
on, establishing a specific title on the environment, laying down the objectives of its
environmental policy, which would be: (1) preserving, protecting and improving the
quality of the environment; (2) protecting human health; (3) prudent and rational
utilization of natural resources and (4) promoting measures at the international level to
deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems
121
. In order to achieve these
objectives, the same article disposes that the Community action shall be based on the
precautionary principle and preventive action, on the axiom that environmental damage
should be rectified at the source of the problem and the basic environmental provision
119
Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 2, 1 C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247.
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See NAFTA, supra note 32, preamble.
121




that the polluter should be the one to pay
122
. These basic environmental principles
123
are
not contained within the NAFTA documents, and the author believes such fact to be an
initial proof of the EC Treaty's superiority considering environmental protection.
Restrictions on Trade
Article 30 of the EC Treaty forbids quantitative restrictions on imports, but there
are a number of exceptions, in which said restrictions would be allowed if justified "...
on grounds of public morality, public policy or public security; the protection of health
and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing
artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the protection of industrial or commercial
property"
124
. These restrictions shall not be considered as arbitrary discrimination or
disguised restrictions on trade among Member states, and therefore are not only
permitted, but also even promoted.
The aforementioned provisions of the EC Treaty are quite similar to articles 301(1)
and 309(1) of NAFTA, which virtually copy the quantitative restriction prohibition and
national treatment clauses established in GATT, forbidding in a similar manner any
disguised restrictions to trade.
Hence, we can see the similarities not only between NAFTA and the EC Treaty, but
also a general global tendency connected to this issue, as reflected in the fact that
NAFTA copies this from GATT.
122
This is an important principle that is omitted from the NAFTA documents. It is a pity, for the North
American environmentalists, because it is the basis of environmental protection. In the EC, this principle
goes so far that subsidies from the Member States are allowed, if not above 15% of the cost, to install
pollution control equipment.
For a detailed explanation of the principles of international environmental law, see PATRICIA W.
BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE ENVIRONMENT 89-1 12 (1995).
124 EC Treaty, supra note 121, art. 36.
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Harmonization ofEnvironmental Laws and Standards
One of the first objectives to accomplish the goal of free trade or a common market
among nations, as we have seen, is the harmonization of different legal standards and
procedures. As previously commented, this generally generates fear among
environmentalists, for they fear that the harmonization will be sought at the lowest
standard possible, and not at the highest, or not even at the already existent one. In
developed countries with high environmental standards this is a problem, especially when
other parties of the agreement are developing nations with low levels of protection.
Both in NAFTA and the EC Treaty we are able to see efforts to harmonize
environmental measures of the nations involved, though in somehow different terms. The
EC treaty establishes a system of full mutual recognition and approximation of national
standards, except for some areas, such as food, medicines and hazardous products, where
full harmonization is required. Under the European approach, it shall be the legislation of
the Community that will set the minimum standards 125 . As long as these are met, Member
States are obliged to recognize each other's environmental standards. Even though, the
mutual recognition approach is recognized as temporary, since there is an intention of
substituting the national standards for others that shall be created by the European
Committee for Standardisation (CEN) and the European Committee for Electrotechnical
Standardisation (CENELEC) 126 . Both of these organizations have EC countries as
members and operate by a voting system.
Concerning the harmonization of measures in NAFTA, we must attend basically to
Chapters Seven and Nine, previously analyzed.
This is different in the aforementioned areas, where a complete harmonization is sought, due to the risks
to human life and health that these imply.
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Richard J. King, Trade and the Environment: European Lessons for North America, 14 UCLA J. Envtl.
L.&Pol'y 209, 230 (1996).
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Article 714 of NAFTA states that "(w]ithout reducing the level of protection of
human, animal or plant life or health, the Parties shall, to the greatest extent practicable
[...], pursue equivalence of their respective sanitary and phytosanitary measures."
Similarly, article 906 refers to technical standards: "[wjithout reducing the level of
safety or of protection of human, animal or plant life or health, the environment or
consumers [...], and taking into account international standardization activities, the
Parties shall, to the greatest extent practicable, make compatible their respective
standards-related measures, so as to facilitate trade in a good or service between the
Parties."
128
It must be noticed that in both provisions there is an emphasis of not reducing the
level of protection of human, animal or plant life or health, and, in the latter, also of the
environment or consumers. This is important for considering the possibilities of creating
pollution havens, which as we saw, was a topic of extreme importance during the
negotiations of the agreement.
In both the NAFTA documents and the EC Treaty there is a specific recognition
that, albeit the sought harmonization of environmental -or other- standards, each country
is free to establish more stringent ones, seeking any higher desired level of environmental
protection. So, a protection from pollution havens is sought in both treaties, by trying to
prevent any decrease in the levels of environmental protection .
In this sense, the EC Treaty determines that Community measures will not prevent
any Member States from establishing others that are of a more strict nature in order to
127 NAFTA, supra note 32, art. 714.
128 NAFTA, supra note 32, art. 906.
Also attending to the issue of possible pollution havens, NAFTA establishes that countries should not
encourage investment by relaxing or derogating domestic health, safety or environmental measures. Even
though, as can be seen by the use of the word "should" instead of "shall", this is an unenforceable




. Hence, there is a minimum set by the Community legislation,
which prevents pollution havens, but Members States may go even further.
Likewise, according to the NAFTA text, each Party is free to adopt its own levels of
protection of human, animal or plant life or health
131
, with some limits' , of which the
most important ones would be that the measures to be taken must not be arbitrary or
unjustifiable distinctions to disguise trade restrictions against another Party, in which case
the affected Party may bring a dispute settlement against such levels of protection.
It must be noticed that in NAFTA, dispute settlements may also be brought against
the measures implemented to achieve the desired levels of protection, as seen in Chapter
three of this paper.
By comparing the NAFTA and EC Treaty's survival tests for environmental
measures during a dispute settlement, we can see that the latter ones are more efficient for
defending environmental provisions. Since the EC Treaty does not require a scientific
basis that demonstrates environmental harms or a risk assessment, it is much easier for an
environmental measure to pass the test. This is of the uttermost importance for
environmental goals, since many of the environmental damages cannot be totally proved,
due to an absence of scientific certainty, as we saw before 133 , which originates the
precautionary principle. While the EC Treaty contains this principle in article 130r, as
130
See EC Treaty, supra note 121, art. 130t. Even though, as shall be seen later on, the mentioned measures
would have to survive some tests, that prove that they are not a disguised restriction to trade and that they
are necessary for their protective objectives. Albeit, the meaning of necessary has been taken broadly by
the Court of Justice, in extreme favor of environmental objectives, and without the strict, scientific
requirements of proof that appear in NAFTA. For further information see Rod Hunter & Koen Muylle,
European Community Environmental Law: Institutions, Law Making, Enforcement and Free Trade, 28
Envtl. L. Rep. 10477, 10490 (1998).
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This is also established in article 3 of the NAAEC, recognizing the right of each of the Parties to
establish their own level of protection.
132 NAFTA, supra note 32, art. 715.
One clear example of this would be the nowadays-famous greenhouse effect, or global warming. It is
true that there has been an increment in the world's temperature, but there are still many doubts concerning
the origin of this problem, since it is difficult to demonstrate to what extent it is a natural event, or if it is
due to gas emissions (such as C0 2 ) coming from man conducted activities, such as industry or motor
vehicles.
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Of course, one of the main advantages that the European Community has over
NAFTA, and one of the reasons that endow it with a completely different nature, is the
existence of created institutions that elaborate common legislation and the related
jurisprudence. The Council of Ministers and the Commission, where it has decision
making powers, would be the created institutions that adopt legal instruments, some of
which are binding to all or some member states and may apply directly to EU citizens in
a vast variety of cases.
There are different kinds of measures that may be adopted in EC Legislation. The
first ones are regulations. These are of general application and shall be applied directly in




Directives are another kind of EC legislation. They are binding in their essence for
the Member States to which they are addressed
136
, but they leave discretion on how to be
implemented, by transposing them into the respective national legislation, procedure
which shall be taken by the Member States as it better suits them. This is the most widely
used of the legal instruments in what concerns environmental measures. Even if the "use
of directives in the environmental area leaves some discretion to the Member States on
134
This is not the only basic environmental principle that NAFTA seems to forget. Others, such as the
principle of "the polluter pays", which do appear in the EC Treaty, are also not included, due mainly to the
lack of possibility to enforce most of NAFTA's environmental provisions, especially the ones contained in
its side agreement.
135
See STEPHEN WEATHERMILL & PAUL BEAUMONT, EC LAW: THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO
THE LEGAL WORKINGS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 207-10 (Penguin Books, 2d ed. 1995).
136
Unlike regulations, a directive does not necessarily apply to all member states.
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how to implement Community rules and considerable discretion in respect of their
enforcement"
137
, it can be said that such legal instruments have covered their purposes in
I TO
a sufficiently satisfactory manner .
As for the direct effects that directives may have, which allow individuals to rely on
such provisions against the State when this one fails to implement the directive in
national law, there are some requirements. Such requirements are the following : (i) the
provision must establish a clear obligation on the part of member states, (ii) the
obligation must be unconditional, (iii) the obligation must not be dependent on further
implementing measures by the institutions of the Community or the member states, and
(iv) member states must not be left with any discretion in the implementation of the
obligation. This is of extreme importance, since it allows citizens to contribute to the
enforcement of environmental legislation
Another kind of legal instruments are the decisions. These may be addressed to a
Member State, firm or individual and are binding in their entirety on those to whom they
are addressed.
137 GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
LAW 1105(1993).
138
Even though, some authors disagree with this, attending to the fact that Member States sometimes fail to
comply with the directives. See Hunter & Muylle, supra note 130, at 10496. Despite this fact, the author
considers that the results have been extraordinarily positive, since in the cases of major environmental
danger, such as directives concerning some air pollutants that imply a high risk for human health,
compliance has been quite acceptable. Of course, there is a problem with non-compliance, since even if
such a case is taken to the Court of Justice, under article 171 of the EC Treaty, the Court has no powers to
enforce its judgements by means of financial penalties. See WEATHERMILL & BEAUMONT, supra note
135, at 209-11.
See J.H Jans, Legal protection in European Environmental Law: An Overview, in PROTECTING THE
EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT: ENFORCING EC ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 49 (Han Somsen ed.,
1996). See also Ludwig Kramer, Direct Effect of EC Environmental Law, in PROTECTING THE
EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT: ENFORCING EC ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 99 (Han Somsen ed.,
1996).
140
In a certain way, it is similar to the procedure established by article 24 of the NAAEC, concerning the
enforcement of environmental laws. Albeit, as it is obvious, there is a big difference between that lax and
unenforceable procedure of such agreement and going to the Court as is the case of the EC: the
participation of the citizen is considerably superior in the latter.
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Finally, there are also some other instruments, such as recommendations, opinions
and resolutions, which are not binding. Even though, "[t]hese provisions cannot have
direct effect in national courts, as they are not binding, but it is competent for a national




This ability of the European Community's institutions to create common legislation
is obviously unparalleled by any ofNAFTA' s bodies, which therefore have no real power
to harmonize the diversity of environmental laws existing in the three Parties of the
agreement. This is certainly a pity, since, as we have seen, the harmonization of these
environmental standards constitutes the basis for a correct and prosper relationship
between trade and environmental interests.
The harmonization of the Community's environmental standards has brought
benefits to all member states, but especially to the less developed countries, such as
Portugal, Greece, Spain, Ireland and Italy, in which environmental protection was almost
nonexistent some years ago. It is impressive how their environmental legal systems have
developed in such a short time lapse, since many nations are still struggling to improve
that area of their respective laws, often copying other systems, such as the American one,
which are obviously not applicable due to a lack of budget
142
.
Hence, the case of the European Community could be taken as a most profitable
example for other countries or economic blocks to follow.
141 WEATHERMILL & BEAUMONT, supra note 135, at 139.
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This is precisely and unfortunately the case of Mexico. Although the LGEEPA was amended,
technically transplanting many ideas from the American legal system, enforcement of the new law has been
quite below the expectations, due to the lack of resources of the Mexican government and inconsistencies
with other national legal provisions. A half-copy is many times worse than none, just as a child who tries to
copy the exam of another, instead of trying on his own, with just a partial, and failing, success. It is much
better to establish a common legislation, taking into account the different capabilities and national legal
systems of the parties.
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A Question ofInterpretation: The Environmental Orientation ofthe Court ofJustice.
It is interesting to notice that, besides the vast environmental legislation of the EC,
the case law is also quite impressive, and usually environmentally friendly. It is really a
most enjoyable surprise for any environmentalist to see that the Court of Justice has
interpreted some of the legal provisions that were plagued by ambiguity and vagueness in
favor of environmental goals.
Some of the most ambiguous provisions, as previously seen, would be the
exceptions to the prohibitions of quantitative restrictions on imports
143
. Even if the EC
Treaty is considerably vague about including protection of the environment in the list
144
-
even if it recognizes the protection of human, animal and plant life- the Court of Justice
has favorably ruled for the environmentalists.
Perhaps the most famous case concerning the application of article 36, which
establishes the aforementioned list, is the Danish Bottles Case . This case dealt with
Danish legislation that established " (i) a mandatory deposit return scheme for soft drink
and beer containers, and (ii) a container approval system"
146
. The Commission brought an
action against such measures, arguing a supposed violation of article 30 of the EC Treaty.
The Court of Justice found that the Danish legislation was not discriminatory as between
domestic and foreign products, but, "considering the application of the proportionality
test to the approval scheme, the [Court of Justice] stated that while a container approval
scheme would result in a higher level of environmental protection, it was
disproportionate to the objective pursued."
147
The important thing for purposes of this
143




Case 302/86, Commission v. Denmark, 1988 E.C.R. 4607.
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paper is that the Court's decision recognized the protection of the environment as a
compulsory requirement.
This decision would necessarily be connected to the one in the Cassis de Dijon
case
148
. Here, the Court recognized that the list of article 36 is not exhaustive, and the
protection given by such provision would be extended to any national measure that
followed a mandatory objective of the EC, if no related EC legislation existed already,
and if it is non-discriminatory and proportional
149
to the objective to be achieved
150
.
Other important cases would be the Wallonian Waste case
151
and Humblot v.
Directeur des services fiscaux
152
. In the first one, which involved a decree banning the
import of all waste products, it was made clear that national measures could not go in
different terms with EC law, since a directive concerning hazardous wastes already
existed. Even though, for other wastes, an important principle was recognized:
environmental damage should be rectified at its source. Hence, following such principle,
something that has not been done in North America, the restrictions for these non-
hazardous wastes were upheld.
The second case attends to the prohibition of taxes on imports that may have a
discriminatory effect
15
. The Court concluded that a tax considered to have an indirectly
discriminatory effect may be considered lawful if the purpose of the internal tax is to
achieve one of the objectives justified by EC law 154 .
148
Case 120/78. Rewe Zentral AG v. Bundesmomopolverwaltung fur Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649.
149
As we saw, the measure of the Danish bottles case was not proportionate.
150
See King, supra note 126, at 214.
151
Case C-2/90, Commission v. Belgium, 1992 E.C.R. 4431.
152
Case 12/84, 1985 E.C.R. 1367.
153 EC Treaty, supra note 121, art. 95.
154
See King, supra note 126, at 216.
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It is important to notice the impressive amount of case law related to environmental
issues existing in the EC, as compared to the environmental related dispute settlements
procedures of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC),
which still remain, and probably shall remain forever, untested. Even though, NAFTA
and its side agreement still have some cases of importance to be analyzed, though the
ones related to Chapter 11, as we have seen, are immersed in a pitiful secrecy which
obviously renders any possible review impossible, and the ones derived from articles 14
and 15 ofNAAEC have no real effects or sanctions to oblige enforcement.
Pollution: the Solution ofthe European Community
Pollution along the Mexican-American border is one of the most commented effects
ofNAFTA as we have seen, due to the promotion of maquiladoras.
In Europe, the problem of interstate pollution is certainly something even more
common along history than in the case of the United States and Mexico. Due to the lack
of space (compared to North America and in terms of geographical distribution of its
inhabitants) and closeness of populations, pollution of one city may become a problem
for dozens of cities, from a diversity of countries
155
. The pollution of one river or water
source may affect several nations. Hence, several measures have been adopted to prevent
this.
It is certainly amazing to see the vast number of legal instruments the EC
institutions have elaborated concerning this issue, which, as previously seen, seems to be





See BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 123, at 133-35 (1995).
156 JOHNSON & BEAULIEU, supra note 1, at 35-64.
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We shall now attend to some of the major pollution problems in Europe and the
legal response to them, to attend to some possible solution for the North American
problems. Hence, we shall analyze water and air pollution first, in a very general manner,
to aboard afterwards the issue of hazardous waste, which is a major topic of controversy
in the Mexican-American border.
Water pollution
The issue of water pollution has always been present in most European countries,
for reasons already explained above. It has become a major problem in Ireland, nation
that was not used to confront such a dilemma due to a low population level and an
underdeveloped industry sector. But, as a result of economic growth fomented by the
establishment of a common market as explained previously, the virgin waters of Ireland
were beginning to disappear.
Water pollution has been attended to in several regulations and directives, which
can be divided in three major categories. These are: (i) those documents setting water
quality objectives for several uses, (ii) those which seek to limit or prohibit industry
discharges of dangerous substances into waters, and (iii) provisions on marine pollution.
Many of these directives and regulations have contributed to establish some limits to this
serious problem, and have helped countries such as Ireland to stop any further depletion
of their water sources
157
.
Suffice to say, the same problems in the Mexican-American border continue, and
are increasing with time. Though there is a diversity of legal documents -which lack any
precise compromises as to discharge specifications- trying to prevent this, the problem
continues without much intervention from any of the governments. Perhaps both of them
Ireland is especially rich in groundwater sources. A special directive, Council Directive 80/68/EEC
(Groundwater), was elaborated to prevent the direct or indirect introduction of listed substances, which are
a main source of drinking water for most Irish people.
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have submitted only to economic interests. Let us hope that the inhabitants of the border
area do not have to pay for such decision with their own safety
Air pollution
Another kind of pollution is the one that affects the air. It is extremely problematic
to regulate this, due to the difficulty to determine the source of many substances that
contribute to the degradation of air quality, or to other problems such as acid rain.
EC law has confronted these problems, especially acid rain, by elaborating a
diversity of directives, which attend to two specific areas: (i) the control of gases coming




Though the elaboration of EC legislation has found resistance from some countries,
new directives are constantly appearing and many of the past problems, especially those
related to lead pollutants, have been partially solved. Even though, not all countries have
a satisfactory history of compliance with the provisions, due to the enormous costs that
air pollution control measures imply.
In North America, as commented, air pollution originated by maquiladoras
continues to increase, despite the enactment of new Mexican environmental provisions.
There are several causes for this: (i) a major economic interest of both Mexican and
American governments, (ii) high costs to enforce air pollution measures, and (iii) lack of
technical expertise -and honesty sometimes- of the Mexican authorities. The European
Union could certainly be used as an example to follow in this area.
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For a detailed explanation of the problem see Stephen M. Lerner, The Maquiladoras and Hazardous
Waste: The Effects under NAFTA, 6 Transnat'l Law 255, 259-61 (1993).
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The 1991 Hazardous Waste Directive
160
requires the Commission to prepare and
periodically revise a list of hazardous wastes
161
, which shall determine the scope of
hazardous waste regulation by the EC. Following this, the Commission submits a
proposal to several national experts. If these officials accept the proposal, according to a
system of weighted majority voting, it shall be adopted as a Commission decision. If it is
rejected, the proposal may be sent to the Council. The Council has thirty days to adopt or
modify the proposal. In case of inactivity of the Council, the proposal shall become law.
This has provided the EC with a quick process to list substances that must be
considered as hazardous wastes. This is extremely relevant for the protection of the
environment and human health, since quick additions may be required, as the dangers of
some substances are discovered . Such a list proves to be invaluable in the trade of
hazardous wastes among member states, allowing countries to import them as raw
materials, in order to be recycled.
It must be noticed that this is a major problem in the trade of hazardous wastes
between Mexico and the United States. By not having a clear list of hazardous wastes,
accepted by both countries, problems always arise in the customs. Mexico has taken the
worst part of it, since its northern territory has become a virtual landfill of the United
States. Most certainly, a common list, such as the one established by the EC, would
contribute to the solution of such dilemma
163




Council Directive 91/689 on Hazardous Waste, 1991 O.J. (L 337) 20.
161
Council Decision 94/904 Establishing a List of Hazardous Waste Pursuant to article 1(4) of Directive
91/689 on Hazardous Waste, 1994 O.J. (L 356) 14.
*" But see Hunter & Muylle, supra note 130, at 10480. Here, the authors are against the listing procedure,
which presents, according to them, a case of comitology, which does not allow the participation of the
public and permits bureaucrats to take decisions without having to respond to the community.
Even if specific agreements have been elaborated to prevent the problem, these have proved to be of no
real use, since no list exists that may solve the problem of what is to be considered a hazardous waste. See
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Of course that this would not be the only reqiurement to solve the controversy,
since other problems arise in the traffic of waste along the border, such as corruption of
the authorities in charge of the inspection and customs.
Agreement between the United States and Mexico on Cooperation for the protection and Improvement of
the Environment in the Border Area, Aug. 14, 1983, U.S.-Mex., T.I.A.S. 10,827.
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For a further detail of the hazardous waste problematic in North America, see Luis R. Vera Morales,
Dumping in the International Backyard: Exportation ofHazardous Wastes to Mexico, 7 Tul. Env. L. Rev.
353 (1994).
CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of the present paper has been to elaborate a brief analysis of the
environmental aspects of NAFTA and its side agreement, the NAAEC, objective which
has tried to be reached through a research involving the history of the agreement, the
agreement itself, the related side agreement and a comparison with what is happening
with the European Union.
As we have been able to see, the environmental effects of NAFTA are to this date
undetermined, but some of them are reviewed in the paper. Much research -which goes
beyond the legal aspects- must still be done to determine these green effects, but the
author of this writing hopes to have contributed at least with a most modest start.
NAFTA is a document with such an ambiguity in its text that much room for
interpretation is left. Unfortunately, the main purposes of NAFTA, of an economic and
commercial nature, may prevail over other issues of public policy, including
environmental issues. In this sense, chapters seven, nine and eleven, as commented, may
contain the greatest dangers for environmental concerns related to the agreement. The
previously unexplored risks of Chapter Eleven have brought as a result a major danger
for which the three countries were not prepared at all. As we saw, this Chapter allows
investors to challenge almost any environmental-related provisions. As with the case of
chapters seven and nine, the ambiguity of the language in Chapter Eleven allows the
investors or stakeholders to nullify these, despite the damage they may generate towards
the environment or common welfare.
Hence, there is a major concern with regard to the interpretation and literal analysis
of NAFTA' s text. Much care should be provided by the parties, in order to solve the
existing loopholes, which represent the greatest of risks for green concerns.
As for the NAAEC, what would be its real nature? What benefits does it bring?
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This is most certainly not an enforceable document that has, (as most authors
describe it) the "teeth'" to oblige the parties to comply with it.
The ambiguity of its language, the broad exceptions established in its dispute
settlement procedure, the lack of real participation of the NGO community in the decision
making within the CEC, demonstrate that the NAAEC was mainly a ruse to make
Congress ratify the NAFTA package and calm down the American environmental
groups' campaign. If one's expectations are an agreement that constrains Mexico to
enforce its environmental laws, one shall certainly feel disappointed. It is even somehow
naive that environmental groups believed that the dispute settlement would work, since,
as experience with the submissions under article fourteen demonstrate, the United States
itself would not be immune to them. Therefore, the greatest expectations that one can
have are that NAAEC shall stimulate the Mexican Government to "green" its policies.
Unfortunately, this depends on political good will, which can change with different
administrations and situations (principally of the economic kind, as the maquiladora issue
has demonstrated). Ultimately, the NAFTA package bends to the economic aspects, and
attends to environmental issues where these shall not be able to obstruct trade, something
that is quite reasonable, since, after all, NAFTA is a trade, not an environmental,
agreement. For such reasons, Chapter Five of the NAAEC, which establishes the dispute
resolution process, contemplating economic sanctions, is very likely to remain unused.
Even though, the NAAEC was not left entirely without effects. It has given
Mexican NGOs and citizens the faculty to complain beyond the Mexican authorities, and
at least allows them the possibility to exercise some pressure over the national
government, since there is no citizen suit system under Mexican Law, only a public
complaint that has had very questionable effects.
There has also been a change in Mexican environmental-related laws and
regulations, and new environmental standards have been established. The problem with
this is the same as usual: Mexico, as a developing country, tries to copy (with some
pressure of the United States) instruments and standards of developed nations, whose
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economical, social, legal and technical realities are so different from its own that the
changes on paper may not have any effect in real life. Certainly, in order to allow free
trade, similar standards are required to exist among the Parties. But the major problem
here is that we are dealing with three countries that have different levels of economic
development, and, hence, the establishment of similar standards may prove to be an idle
thing to do, if the consequences and capacity of national authorities are not carefully
analyzed before adopting new regulations, as has been done in the European Union.
It is absurd to establish a standard when there are no means, both technical and
economical, to make it enforceable. It is naive to expect that any government shall close
down a pollutant company that does not comply with the environmental laws, when there
is absolutely no technical or economic feasibility to do better and when thousands of
workers, already living in the most dire conditions, depend only on the jobs provided by
it. Likewise, it is ridiculous to establish measures that are contradictory to the national
constitution or legal system, since they shall be legally unenforceable. It is somehow
disturbing to see that many international agreements simply try to impose a system that
has worked in developed countries upon a completely different scenery.
Therefore, in order for NAFTA, NAAEC or any agreement derived form these to
achieve positive results, a proper analysis of the economic, social and legal situation of
Mexico or any developing countries must be realized, since without it the risk of no
effects or (even worse) negative ones of these agreements shall be considerably high, as
may unfortunately prove to be the case with NAFTA.
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